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This dissertation consists of three free-standing chapters, all of which
deal with themes in the philosophy of language in general and in pragmatics
in particular.
Chapter 1 augments an existing model of discourse-level information
structure in order to articulate relevance conditions that make the right pre-
dictions about the class of utterances I call higher order utterances. The ap-
paratus introduced turns out also to have some utility for the representation
of a certain kind of discourse defectiveness.
Chapter 2 explores an analogy between communication and knowledge
to ultimately advance the thesis that communication is not a uniquely valuable
type of signaling event.
Chapter 3 draws connections between propaganda and polarization,
and then between the measurement of polarization and the tools used in the
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modeling of discourse structure. The upshot is that tools from formal prag-
matics have an application in the characterization, and perhaps ultimately
detection, of propaganda.
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Chapter 0
Introduction
The three chapters of this dissertation are free-standing contributions to
literatures in and around the philosophy of language. However, they are each
to some degree an examination of the phenomenon of discourse-level informa-
tion structure. Informally, discourse-level information structure consists of the
information shared in a discourse, along with the way this information is orga-
nized into topics. That the contents of iterated signaling transactions among
human beings can be expected to be interrelated rather than independent—
that conversations are, in this way, organized— seems so inevitable that it is
difficult to imagine an agent who didn’t already know this being able to engage
in communication at all. But while the mere fact that conversation tends to
involve the organized exchange of information may be self-evident, articulating
the nature of this organization is a challenge. Meeting this challenge, however,
pays considerable dividends (or stands to) in the study of language and, it is
the suggestion of two of the dissertation’s three chapters, in understanding the
goals of collaborative deliberation. Whether in its capacity as a factor in lin-
guistic inference, as a source of value for discourse, or as an observable proxy
for the deliberative processes of the conversationalists, information structure
figures in all three chapters.
xi
The first chapter is an examination of how an existing approach to mod-
eling information structure (Roberts (1996, 2012)) can be augmented to reflect
the conversational dynamics of higher order utterances (HOUs). Higher order
utterances are those that describe or comment upon the information structure
of the discourse itself, and they are distinctive in that they are relevant at any
point in discourse. Now, in question-under-discussion based models of infor-
mation structure, an utterance’s relevance has typically been accounted for in
terms of its bearing the relation of answerhood, or else of subquestionhood, to
the question presently at the top of the stack. But HOUs, characteristically,
don’t answer the question presently under discussion; they restate or describe
the question, request clarification of it, or comment on its strategic merit or
appropriateness. Question-under-discussion models have thus generated false
predictions with respect to HOUs. I consider how to address this issue in
the light of the insight that, at least for a subset of HOUs, their distinctive
function involves questioning the relation of the question-under-discussion to
a broader set of interlocutor goals. I argue that thinking of information struc-
ture as involving a set of stacks, one for each order of discourse, allows us to
characterize the information structural effects distinctive of HOUs (i.e. that
they add and answer questions on higher order stacks) and so articulate rele-
vance conditions consistent with the data of speaker judgments. The positive
proposal can be thought of as suggesting that, in interlocutors’ attempts to
answer the question “what is the world like?” the subquestion “what is this
conversation like?” has a special status. A theory of context which carves out
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a special way of representing information that answers this question offers not
only a way to distinguish the effects of HOUs, but also a way of representing
certain kinds of common discourse defectiveness.
The second chapter is an extended consideration of the analogy between
communication and knowledge, which ultimately invokes information structure
to account for the unique value of a kind of signaling event other than com-
munication. The chapter starts from the observation that the justification,
truth, and belief conditions of the classical analysis of knowledge each have an
analog condition in standard analyses of communication; call the analogous
conditions on communication A, B, and C. Next, it lays out the evidence that
ABC are not jointly sufficient conditions on communication, in just the way
that Gettier cases show JTB conditions on knowledge not to be. Moreover, it
seems as though proposals for a fourth condition which, alongside ABC, would
make for a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on communication,
are plagued by many of the same issues that have aﬄicted such proposals in the
analysis of knowledge literature. My project in this chapter was not to propose
a successful analysis of communication, but to depart from the conclusion that
a Gettier-proof analysis will be hard to come by, and will no doubt involve
a fairly tortured, gerrymandered fourth condition, in the way that Jonathan
Kvanvig (2003) does from his analogous conclusion about knowledge. Kvanvig
suggests that whatever this fourth condition on knowledge is, it will not be
such as to render knowledge more valuable than justified true belief; knowl-
edge, he therefore suggests, is not actually a uniquely valuable epistemic state.
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What he goes on to argue, however, is that the reasons that suggest that jus-
tified true belief is more epistemically valuable than mere true belief likewise
suggest that the state of understanding is more valuable than justified true be-
lief or knowledge, where understanding consists in having (possibly Gettiered)
justified true beliefs about a “chunk” of related information, and seeing how
the individual bits of information in this chunk are related to one another. I
explore the analogous argument that communication is not more valuable than
signaling events which satisfy A, B and C; it follows that communication is
not a uniquely valuable sort of signaling event. The question that then arises
is whether understanding has an analog in the domain of signaling events. I
suggest that it does; just as understanding consists in justified true beliefs
about a chunk of related information and the ability to see the connections
between these pieces of information, comprehension consists in ABC (the au-
dience’s entertaining the proposition intended by the speaker, and moreover
doing so because it is manifest to her that the speaker wants her to do on the
basis of the utterance), with respect to a collection of utterances, alongside
an appreciation of the connections between utterances in this collection. A
“collection of utterances” is naturally identified as a discourse, and grasping
the connections between the discourse’s constitutive utterances is naturally
thought of as a matter of tracking the discourse’s information structure. This
suggestion elevates an audience’s grip on discourse-level information structure
as the distinguishing feature of a signaling event more intrinsically valuable
than communication itself.
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The final chapter of the dissertation suggests that the information struc-
ture of a conversation can be thought of as a proxy for the deliberative strategy
undertaken in that conversation. Intuitively, agents may diverge in their con-
sideration of an issue not merely insofar as they reach different conclusions;
they may also regard different considerations as salient to their deliberation,
and so diverge in the way they reason even prior to, or in the absence of,
any discrepancy in conclusions. There are many compelling reasons one might
want to investigate this sort of deliberative strategy variation in a population,
but of course deliberation itself is not directly observable. However, if we
regard discourse as a way of enacting a collaborative deliberative process, we
might conclude that the information structure of the conversation is an attrac-
tive proxy for the phenomenon of deliberative strategy. QUD-based models,
as opposed to topic-modeling techniques that construe topics as frequency
distributions across a collection of terms, have particular potential as a tool
for analyzing how deliberation proceeds in a given conversation because the
sub-question/ super-question relations they include encode the instrumental
relationships between different deliberative tactics. Where we are interested
in comparing the ways that agents reason about an issue, we then do well to
turn to the discourses that these agents participate in concerning this issue and
compare the structured contents of their question stacks. More ambitiously,
our information-structural tools suggest a way of zooming out to look at delib-
erative strategy variation around a particular issue across a whole polity. This
possibility brings the theme of information structure into contact with issues
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in democratic theory, specifically with ideals of public reason and justifica-
tion as elaborated in the work of Rawls and Habermas. Whether we conceive
of public reason as requiring actual inter-agent deliberation about key policy
issues, or else as requiring their hypothetical capacity to offer one another
reasons, looking at the distribution of deliberative strategy variation across a
polity offers a powerful tool for quantifying the degree to which these ideals
are satisfied. I argue furthermore that the type of polarization which this ap-
proach helps us detect, deliberative polarization, actually constitutes a kind of
propagandistic presence in mass discourse. With this connection forged, our
information structural tools then turn out also to be propaganda-detecting
tools.
The implicit supposition which connects the chapters of this disser-
tation is that models of discourse-level information structure capture not
only the contours of discourse, but of deliberation itself. With this in mind,
chapter two’s proposal that interlocutors’ being on the same page about the
information-structure of the conversation is uniquely valuable reads as the
suggestion that co-deliberation is a central concern of signalers as such. And
this suggestion seems like a scaled-down version of public reason theorists’
contention that a sort of co-deliberation is a condition on the legitimacy of a
policy regime, as discussed in chapter three. Taken as a whole, this disserta-
tion’s contribution is to make visible the connection between a subject matter
of central concern in near-side pragmatics and issues in far-side pragmatics,
epistemology, and political theory.
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Chapter 1
Information Structure in Higher Order and
Defective Discourse
1.1 Introduction
Discourses are collections of utterances. Scrutiny of these collections,
moreover, reveals a variety of relations that obtain between these utterances:
they are temporally ordered with respect to one another; some proffer con-
tent that is anaphorically tied to a part or the whole of the content of others;
some are syntactically isomorphic to one another; some are made by the same
conversational participant, and so on. All this is to say that discourses are
structured, in many different ways. This paper contributes to the project of
describing the level of discourse structure1 at which relevance facts are visi-
ble. Specifically, I will be adding a refinement to accounts of discourse-level
information structure which construe discourse as organized around questions
under discussion that allows them to handle the conversational dynamics of
what I call higher order utterances. I will be discussing specifically the imple-
1Roberts has since moved away from referring to the phenomenon at hand here as “in-
formation structure,” partially in recognition of the fact that this same name is widely
used for a different, utterance-level phenomenon( Roberts (2012b), p. 6, fn. 3). I speak
here of “discourse-level information structure” in order to disambiguate while maintaining
terminological continuity with Roberts’ 1996/2012 essay.
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mentation of the question-under-discussion approach found in Roberts (1996,
2012)2.
In what follows, I outline the question-under-discussion approach to
information structure and discuss relevance as a target phenomenon (§2). I
then present a case of the sort that I argue poses a challenge to existing
accounts (§3) and suggest a refinement of Roberts’ model that would allow it
to generate the right predictions about the relevance of higher order discourse
(§4). I go on to discuss the ways in which the apparatus my solution relies
upon is independently motivated by considerations around the representation
of defective discourses (§5).
1.2 Discourse-level Information Structure and Relevance
1.2.1 Roberts’ Information Structure
The central project of near-side pragmatics is to give a theory of con-
text; a theory of discourse-level information structure is an elaboration on
such a theory. The question-under-discussion approach to discourse structure
starts from some assumptions well-established in the literature: that the goal
of discourse is information exchange (e.g. Stalnaker (1978)); that this infor-
mation exchange is further regulated by a norm of cooperativity which either
is identical to or else subsumes a norm of relevance (Grice (1967); cf. Sper-
ber & Wilson (1986); and that which conversational moves count as licit at
2Though note that thee question-under-discussion approach was independently proposed
and developed in Ginzburg (1994, 1995a,b, 1996, 2012)
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a particular moment is a function of the state of discourse (or conversational
‘score’) just prior to that moment (e.g. Lewis (1979)).
The Roberts apparatus for modeling information structure builds off of
the familiar Stalnaker (1978, 2002a) model of context. On this model, a con-
versation has an associated common ground, which contains the set of those
propositions such that every party to discourse holds them to be true (or is
committed to acting as though they do). The context set is the intersection of
the propositions in the common ground. When one speaker makes an assertion
and the other accepts its content as true (or commits to acting as though it
is), that assertion functions to add a proposition to the common ground and
so (typically) to shrink the context set. The semantic value of an interrogative
is the set of propositions that would count as full answers to that question
(Hamblin (1973a))3. In the model, questions can then be thought of as parti-
tioning the context set into cells, each of which contains a proposition which
constitutes some one complete answer to the question (Groenendijk & Stokhof
(1984a)).
But the above doesn’t yet provide the resources with which to make
sense of information structure; as far as has been specified thus far, the func-
3A partial answer entails the truth or falsity of at least one the set of alternative propo-
sitions denoted by the question to which it is an answer. A full answer entails the truth
or falsity of every member of that set (p. 11). An example: were the question “What did
Donald Davidson like to eat?”, a partial answer would be “Donald Davidson liked to eat
Brussels sprouts,” where this comes with no implication that Brussels sprouts were the only
food he enjoyed. In contrast, a full answer would exhaustively list the food that he liked:
“Donald Davidson liked to eat Brussels sprouts and baked yams and avocado sandwiches
and...foodn”.
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tion an assertion or question has vis-a`-vis the context set is insensitive to the
relevance of the speech act.4 Modeling information structure “requires a richer
notion of context” (Roberts (2012), p. 59) that reflects the way in which par-
ticipants’ goals in a discourse are more specific than the exchange of any old
bits of information about the world.
Roberts’ enrichment strategy is to have certain intentions registered in
the common ground along with the content of utterances. Specifically, when a
question is raised and accepted by all parties, the intention to pursue it (until
a full answer is reached or found to be presently unreachable) is registered in
the common ground. That question becomes the “question under discussion”
and constrains which utterances can count as relevant as follows:
relevance1: A move m is relevant iff, where q is the question under dis-
cussion,
1. m introduces (directly or by implicature) a partial answer to q OR
2. m is part of a strategy to answer q
One question, q1, is part of a strategy to answer another, q2, if any
complete answer to q2 entails a complete answer to q1. Where this relation-
ship obtains, Roberts (following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984a)) says that q2
entails q1. For example, the question “Who went to the party” entails the
4Unless, of course, the irrelevance of the speech act is such as to make it uninterpretable
by the audience, in which case the irrelevance might indeed prevent the context set’s con-
tracting to reflect the addition of any new information.
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question “Did Mary go to the Party?” because a full answer to the former
entails a full answer to the latter. Where this relation obtains between q1 and
q2 , it can also be said that q1 is a subquestion of q2, and q2 a superquestion
of q1. It should be noted that one question can also be said to contextually
entail another when a full answer to the first question, in conjunction with
some proposition(s) in the common ground, entail an answer to the second
question. Some questions are then the sub- or super-questions of others only
relative to the state of the common ground. It is frequently strategic to break
unmanageably large questions down into more easily answered subquestions.
Because it is often the case that there are, in this sense, multiple questions be-
ing pursued at once (i.e. a superquestion is being answered via answers to its
subquestions) Roberts’ enrichment of the common ground involves not merely
the addition of a slot for the single question of immediate interest at any given
time, but a stack of these, in which strategic subquestions are placed on top
of their superquestions and then whisked off the top of the stack once they’re
answered or deemed unanswerable.
A natural question arises as to what “raising” a question amounts to.
While it sometimes occurs that a speaker will explicitly utter a question in
order to engage her interlocutor in answering it, there are clearly felicitous
utterances that take place without a question’s being explicitly uttered be-
forehand. In these cases, what is the question under discussion? An ongoing
literature (Rooth (1985, 1992), Beaver & Clark (2008), Roberts (1996, 2012),
Simons et al. (2017)) has developed the idea that intonational focus, among
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other utterance features, associates the content of a declarative utterance with
a set of other propositions. This set of propositions resembles the sort of ob-
ject which the above analysis associates with interrogative utterances; in this
way, declarative utterances too can be seen to introduce questions, as well as
answering them.
On Roberts’ account, the question with which an assertion is congruent
(i.e. that which it answers) is a sort of presupposition of that utterance; the
utterance presupposes that the context is such that the question it answers is
the one under discussion. In cases where the question with which an utterance
is congruent is not yet in the common ground, that question can sometimes
be admitted by way of an accommodation process (Roberts (1996, 2012) pp.
31-34). This then allows questions to enter the common ground without being
explicitly uttered by any party to the conversation.
However, there are some points in discourse that are particularly ripe
for new questions to be introduced as those under discussion (i.e. the very
beginning, and at any juncture where the prior question has been exhaustively
answered or found to be unanswerable) and it is perhaps at these points that
Roberts envisions new questions being introducible via this accommodation
process. Moreover, it should already be clear that we can happily accept the
legitimacy of adding a new question when that question is a subquestion of
the prior question under discussion, as this amounts just to the initiation of a
strategy to answer the prior question.
A formal characterization of the Roberts (2012) model is as follows:
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InfoStrD = 〈M,Q,A,<,Acc, CG,QUD〉
1. M is the set of moves in D
2. Q is the set of questions in D (Q ⊆ M)
3. A is the set of answers in D (A ⊆ M)
4. < is the temporal precedence relation, a total order on M such that:
(a) mi < mk iff mi is made before Mk in D
5. Acc is the set of accepted moves in the discourse (Acc ⊆ M)
6. CG is a function from M to sets of propositions, yielding for each m ∈
M the common ground of D just prior to the making of m.
7. QUD is a function from M to ordered subsets of Q ∩ Acc such that, for
all m ∈ M:
(a) For all q ∈ Q ∩ Acc, q ∈ QUD(m) iff:
i. q <m
ii. CG(m) doesn’t entail an answer to q and q has not been deter-
mined to be unanswerable.
(b) QUD(m) is totally ordered by <.
(c) For all q, q’ ∈ QUD(m), if q < q’, then the complete answer to q’
contextually entails a partial answer to q
7
1.2.2 Relevance?
Having presented Roberts’ characterization of relevance (relevance1),
I want to step back to consider a worry about the target phenomenon. Rele-
vance seems clearly to admit of multiple conceptions. Various projects in which
some notion of relevance has been prominent have foregrounded different as-
pects of our pre-theoretic notion(s). It is after all not clear that accounts which
identify relevance with a maximization of the ratio of information to process-
ing cost (e.f. Sperber & Wilson (1986)) and those which identify it with the
quantity and improbability of an utterance’s conveyed information (Bar-Hillel
& Carnap (1953), van Rooij (2003)) are targeting the same phenomenon. And
it’s less plausible yet that the two foregoing types of theories are targeting
exactly the same thing as either the Relevance logician’s variable sharing prin-
ciple (e.g. Anderson & Belnap (1975)) or the Gricean’s Maxim of Relation
(Grice (1967)). This multiplicity raises the specter of a catastrophic method-
ological confusion: we will here be in the business of considering intuitions
about relevance as data to which a theory of relevance must be commensu-
rate, but if the phenomenon tracked by these elicited intuitions is unstable,
the data will not in fact present a target susceptible to one unified theoretical
treatment. So much, goes the worry, for any objection to an existing theory of
relevance based on such data, or for whatever theory we end up with on the
basis of an adaptation to such an objection.
But that there is such a range of claims, both pre-theoretic and techni-
cal, made upon the nature of relevance (or at least upon the right to use the
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term) is ultimately unproblematic for our project. What motivates Roberts’
project is the promise that an account of relevance will allow for an explicit
representation of the inferences behind, say, implicature derivation or ambigu-
ity resolution. In the case of implicature derivation, relevance is presumed to
be involved in the way suggested by Grice; that is, it’s absence in an utterance
triggers the search for an implication, and its presence is a necessary condition
on a proposition’s presence in the space within which the search for an impli-
catum takes place5. In the case of ambiguity resolution, relevance is a feature
that disposes one parse (if syntactic ambiguity) or sense (if semantic) to be
favored over another. These motivating uses of the term relevance provide a
functional characterization of the phenomenon for which we’re here interested
in giving an account; that is, we are targeting specifically the feature that does
this work in linguistic inference.
Moreover, the functional characterization of relevance provided by the
Gricean story about implicature derivation suggests an oblique way of gath-
ering intuitions about an utterance’s status vis-a`-vis the targeted property of
relevance, one free of the pitfalls of a more direct elicitation method. Whereas
proffering an example and asking respondents directly about whether it is rel-
evant comes with the above worry about tracking different phenomena, the
following three-step method provides a principled way of gathering data con-
cerning specifically the notion of relevance in which we’re interested.
5Except in the case of so-called “actual violations” of the maxim of relation. See fn. 6.
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The first step is to create a coherent discourse segment with a final
utterance, u. First ask the hypothetical respondent whether u is generally
acceptable/ unmarked/ felicitous. A negative response here is evidence that u
is not licit, though it doesn’t isolate irrelevance as the reason for this. However,
where we assume that relevance, in the targeted sense, is a necessary condition
on general felicity, a positive verdict amounts a fortiori to a verdict of u’s
relevance.
Second, where u survives this first step, the respondent is then asked:
1. “What did the speaker mean to get across in making u?” OR
2. “Is it plausible that the speaker meant to get i′ across in making u?”
Because a condition on a proposition’s being arrived at as an impli-
catum of a felicitous utterance is that it satisfy the maxim of relation6, if a
felicitous utterance, u, made at a time, t, plausibly generates an implicature
with content i, then some part of i must be relevant at t.
The above qualification about part of i being relevant anticipates the
necessity of the third step of this elicitation method. It is widely appreciated
that a single utterance can communicate more than one proposition and that
these propositions may“differ in their primacy”(Tonhauser (2012), p. 1), with
some being “at-issue” and others “not-at-issue”. For instance, non-restrictive
6At the end of Section 4 I’ll cop to the fact that this isn’t strictly true on the Gricean
account. At that time, however, I’ll also provide a reason to think that the simplification
at this stage was harmless
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relative clauses, epithets and conventional implicatures (see e.g. Potts (2005))
generally encode secondary information. Not-at-issue content, it turns out,
typically isn’t relevant. In order for our method to isolate that content which
a respondent can be taken to have deemed relevant, it will be necessary to strip
not-at-issue out from the yield of the previous step. This can be done through
the application of diagnostics like projection (Simons et al. (2010, 2013)) and
assent/dissent tests (Tonhauser (2012)).
We should regard a bit of content’s surviving these three steps as ev-
idence of its relevance, and this content’s status as relevant as data to which
an account must be commensurate.
In the interests of sharply delineating the boundary between data and
theory, we note the following: the worry that started this section suggested
that a principled way of isolating relevance data would have to have some
basic characterization of relevance built in. The three step elicitation method
just given amounts to a stipulation that relevant content is that which is felic-
itous, speaker-meant, and at-issue. An account of discourse-level information
structure like Roberts’ is a substantive account of why some content is this
way.
One worry about maintaining the independence of data from theory
here is that at-issueness is invoked in our stipulative characterization of rele-
vance but is elsewhere stipulatively connected with the QUD-framework (i.e.
Simons et al. (2010)); assuming the transitivity of this connection, this forges
a stipulative connection between our target notion of relevance and the QUD-
11
based explanation of this phenomenon, whereas this relationship is supposed
to be substantive. I think this apparent triviality is remediable if we here char-
acterize at-issueness in the employed in, say Tonhauser (2012). That is, we can
define at-issueness here informally as simply the state of being primary or “the
point” of the utterance, or else operationally as that which survives projection
and assent/ dissent diagnostics, thereby severing the stipulative connection
and leaving room for a substantive one.
1.3 Problem Cases
Consider the following case:
Cookies: Alexia and Bridget are out running errands before going
to join other friends. Bridget happens to know that Alexia is in love
with one of the friends they will be seeing, Cara. However, both
Bridget and Alexia know that Cara is not romantically available.
Bridget and Alexia have not discussed Cara in any connection thus
far today. While at the bakery, Alexia says:
A: What kind of cookies do you think Cara likes?
B1: Oh, maybe oatmeal?
A2: No, too healthy.
B2: Oh, well in that case they have those double fudge ones?
A3: Too sticky!
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Now imagine the following possible responses by Bridget:
B3i: Alexia, this conversation is annoying.
B3ii: Alexia, Cara has a girlfriend.
B3iii: Honestly, wouldn’t roses be better?
To my ear, B3i-iii are felicitous, if perhaps unwelcome by Alexia. More-
over, note that B3i-iii come after Bridget has, over the course of several utter-
ances, acquiesced to Alexia’s line of questioning; “what kind of cookies do you
think Cara likes?” was accepted as the question under discussion. But note
that B3i-iii do not clearly answer this question.
That these are obviously answers to the question wouldn’t be a coun-
terexample to the above account if either of them implicated something that
did. Grice characterized merely apparent violations of relevance as cases where
an utterance would be irrelevant if a speaker didn’t have some background be-
lief (which they intended to be inferrable) in light of which the content of the
utterance was relevant to the matter at hand, thereby implicating the content
of that background belief (p. 51)7. Roberts is likewise happy to accept an
utterance as not actually violating relevance so long as it provides or impli-
cates an answer to a question contextually entailed by that under discussion
7In contrast, Grice’s famous example of an actual violation of relevance is one in which
a party guest says something rude and her interlocutor immediately begins to talk about
something else, implicating that she disapproves of the first speaker’s utterance. For most
discussion, see §4 of this paper
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(Roberts (1996, 2012), p. 12). Below I paraphrase Grice’s familiar example
of a merely apparent violation of relevance, and directly beneath it I offer a
reconstruction of how we might explain the derivation of the implicatum Grice
had in mind using the QUD account of relevance:
D: Where can I get petrol?8
E: There is a garage around the corner.
Grice’s original gloss on this case is as follows:
[The utterer of E] would be infringing the maxim ‘Be relevant’
unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and
has petrol to sell; so he implicates that the garage is, or at least
may be open, etc (Grice (1967), p. 311)
And here is a gloss which respects Grice’s basic interpretive moves but
makes explicit a question-under-discussion account of relevance:
1. E does not answer the question raised by D (NB: it would have been a
direct answer if it had read “At the gas station around the corner”).
2. If E is nonetheless assumed to be cooperative and to be consistent with
having accepted D as the question under discussion, it must be that
8Grice’s original has the initial utterance as “I’m out of petrol.” I’ve altered it so as
to make the Roberts-style derivation briefer, but I expect that, with a certain pattern of
intonational focus assumed and a longer derivation, the machinery at hand could nonetheless
do the job.
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there is a piece of information in light of which E can be seen to further
a strategy to answer D.
3. In light of the fact that petrol is sold at garages that are open and
haven’t run out of stock (which is a proposition in the common ground),
one strategy for answering D would be to ask, “Where is there a garage
that is open and not out of stock?”
4. “There is a garage around the corner” (the proposition directly said in
E) still doesn’t quite provide an answer to this question, but the closely
related proposition “there is a garage around the corner that is open and
isn’t out of stock” does.
5. The supposition that “there is a garage around the corner that is open
and isn’t out of stock” is a proposition meant by E would render E
relevant.
6. E implicates that the garage around the corner is open and has petrol
in stock.
Note that step 3 relies on an accommodation of an elaboration on the
QUD stack, and that this step is critical to the ultimate derivation of the
implicature; this is a step that Grice’s original gloss doesn’t explicitly include.
What it suggests is that the derivation of conversational implicatures on the
basis of the Maxim of Relation’s being flouted requires not just the search for
an answer to the question under discussion different from what is said, but a
search for a new (if strategically related) question under discussion.
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Returning to my putative problem cases then, the fact that B3i-iii aren’t
obviously answers to the question under discussion doesn’t by itself mean that
they fail to satisfy Roberts’ conditions on relevance. If a derivation like the
one above can show that they constitute a partial answer to A, or else that
they implicate one, these cases would be no counterexample at all. But this is
not possible. Specifically, there’s no reasoning akin to that performed in step
3 of the sample derivation above which could be applied in the problem case:
provided that Alexia and Bridget don’t have some very unusual mutual beliefs,
there is no fact in the common ground (or retrievable for accommodation into
the common ground) which, taken in conjunction with A, would contextually
entail a question to which B3i-iii were answers.
B3i (depending on intonational focus, inter alia) can be seen as an
answer to questions like “What is this conversation like?” or “What is an-
noying?”. It is not that it would be impossible for these questions to be
contextually entailed by A; if a proposition in the common ground was that
Bridget and Alexia having an annoying conversation entailed that Cara’s fa-
vorite cookies were chocolate chip, then this fact in conjunction with A would
entail a question to which B was an answer. But among the problems with
this interpretation is the fact that we can judge B relevant even where it is
stipulated that there is no such fact in the common ground. B itself just isn’t
even a partial answer to A, and nor does it clearly implicate something that
is.
B3ii and B3iii, while similar to B3i in their capacities as counterexam-
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ples, raise some additional complexities it will be worth our while to attend to.
Like B3i, B3ii answers neither A nor any question that we need suppose A to
contextually entail in order to find B3ii felicitous. It plausibly answers ques-
tions like “Does Cara have a girlfriend?” and “What does Cara have?” and,
absent a common ground which includes the proposition that people with sig-
nificant others prefer snickerdoodles, neither of these questions is contextually
entailed by A. B3ii might strike us intuitively as implicating something like
“Wooing Cara with cookies is pointless/ inappropriate/ not likely to succeed”
or else perhaps that “Talking about wooing Cara with cookies is pointless/
inappropriate/ not likely to succeed.” But these questions, certainly, are not
contextually entailed by A. B3iii likewise doesn’t answer the question at hand,
and like B3ii seems to dismiss A as not worth discussing; however, whereas
B3ii rejected any line of conversation that involved scheming about how to
woo Cara, B3iii is a less profound critique; it merely suggests that cookies are
the wrong tactic (in contrast, at least, with flowers)when it comes to Cara ,
and therefore that talking about which cookies to get Cara is misguided.
The key observation we should draw from this examination of B3i-iii is
that comments concerning the merit of the strategy embodied by the question
stack are generally not answers to the questions on that stack, or answers to
strategic subquestions which might be added to the stack.
B3i-iii are instances of what we’ll call a higher order utterance (HOU).
Higher order talk concerns the character, strategy, or desirability of the dis-
course structure itself, and a distinctive feature of such utterances seems to
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be that they can be relevantly inserted at virtually any point in the discourse
whose merit or organization they concern. B3i-iii are higher order utterances
because they either state or generate an implicature to the effect that the
matter being discussed is not one worth talking about, and this is a statement
about the desirability of the current conversation.
The category I want to circumscribe with the phrase “higher order ut-
terance” is related to other categories of speech which have accrued associated
literatures, but is not, I don’t think, precisely coextensive with any of them.
For instance, higher order discourse is related to what, in discourse analysis
and language education literatures, is called metadiscourse, which includes all
the heterogenous phenomena that might be thought of as “’discourse about
discourse’ or ’talk about talk’” (Hyland (2005), p. 16). These literatures have
interpreted this to include, for instance, any use of epistemic modals (e.g. “It
must have rained”) or propositional attitudes attributions (e.g. “I believe that
he will arrive soon”) as these function to organize or comment on other con-
tents of a text or spoken discourse. But the category of HOUs doesn’t include
mere commentary on other expressed content, at least not as such; the term
“higher order utterance” is being used here to refer specifically to utterances
about the discourse’s information structure (i.e about which pieces of infor-
mation are in the common ground, and what is on the question stack), not
just about any bits of content that may have been proffered, with assertoric
force or otherwise, in the course of that discourse. I therefore take HOUs to
be a proper subcategory of metadiscourse.
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The category of HOUs is likewise related to that of metacommunicative
interaction (MCI), where
By metacommunicative interaction one means any interaction that
comments about the communicative process underlying an utter-
ance. More specifically, the commonest MCI utterances are: ac-
knowledgements that an utterance has been understood, clarifica-
tion requests (CRs) in which an unclear aspect of the utterance
is queried, and corrections, where indications are provided of er-
roneous assumptions concerning naming, concepts associated with
predicates etc. (Ginzburg & Macura (2007), p. 288)
I take the categories of MCI and HOUs to overlap, but they differ in
two respects. First, MCI involves interlocutors working to get on the same
page about the description of the context, while higher order utterances can
be descriptive but can also be normative, i.e. can concern how the discourse
should or should not be. Second, MCI includes attempts to verify, acknowledge
and correct the language that was used in an utterance, i.e. “Did you say
‘Bo’?” “Did you mean to say ‘Bro’?” (Ginzburg (2012) p. 149, Purver et al.
(2001)). In contrast, we are restricting the category of higher order discourse
to those utterances which concern the information structure of the discourse,
and so excluding utterances which concern features of the discourse upstream
from the expression or comprehension of content.
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Figure 1.1: Higher Order Discourse and Related Phenomena
In the above figure, Region A includes what I’ve suggested we think of
as normative HOUs; these are questions and assertions about how the question
under discussion stack should be (e.g. “Should we be talking about this?”).
Region B is populated by utterances that count as both metacommunicative
interaction and HOU; these are descriptive HOUs which are clarification re-
quests, acknowledgements, and corrections about the QUD stack (e.g. “What
were we talking about?”, “How is this related that last thing?”) . Region C
contains metacommunicative utterances that comment on elements of the dis-
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course upstream from content (e.g. “Did you mean to say...”). Finally, region
D includes metadiscourse which comments on the speaker’s relationship to
other content expressed in the discourse without commenting on the discourse
per se (e.g. “I think I’ll go to the park”, “The Cubs might win”).
This terminological issue out of the way, let’s be clear on the nature of
the foregoing relevance conditions’ inadequacy when it comes to HOUs. The
issue is that the model doesn’t have the resources to characterize higher order
utterances, and so doesn’t allow for the articulation of relevance conditions
that respect their special character. That there are constraints on moving
between first order questions is intuitive and is, indeed, a basic supposition of
Roberts’ project. The higher order cases which I have discussed demonstrate
that movement up to second order discourse is relatively unrestricted. To mo-
tivate a third general principle of discourse movement, consider the following
discourse amongst interlocutors C, D, and E:
Gossip
F1: I heard that Mary’s been looking for jobs elsewhere.
G1: I heard the same from Lisa in accounting.
H1: We shouldn’t be talking about this.
F2: Do you really think it’s inappropriate to engage in a bit of
harmless gossip?
G2: Her supervisor’s also been looking worried.
21
The intuition here is not that G2 is a totally bizarre or implausible
utterance, but that it is irrelevant unless it is given an implicative reading, on
which its surface irrelevance triggers a search for an implicatum. Indeed, the
case strongly resembles Grice’s example of an implicature-generating “actual”
violation of the maxim of relation; speaker G, one might infer, is uninterested
in the second order question which H1 and F2 are attempts to answer (i.e.
“Is it appropriate to talk about whether Mary is looking for jobs elsewhere?”).
G2’s reversion to the first order question “Is Mary looking for work elsewhere?”
generates this conclusion as an implicature9. All of this suggests that moving
down through orders of discourse, when a higher order question under discus-
sion has not yet been answered or deemed to be unanswerable, is something
that our model should predict to be irrelevant.
In summary, I think that relevance intuitions suggest as coarse desider-
ata on a set of relevance conditions that they preserve the following three
principles:
Restricted Lateral Movement (RLM): there are constraints on mov-
ing between questions of the same order.
Unrestricted Upward Movement (UUM): there are no constraints on
moving to a question one order up from that addressed by the immedi-
ately prior move.
9Notably, G2’s implicatum is actually third order, which the relevance conditions I offer
below predict to make the utterance relevant. For a fuller gloss on G2’s dynamics, see fn.
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Restricted Downward Movement (RDM): there are constraints on
moving to a question of a lower order than that that addressed by the
immediately prior move.
This is clearly only very schematic. However, it will be serviceable to
have introduced this distinction among desiderata. Specifically what it allows
us to point out is that the original model is designed to satisfy RLM, but that
it has no resources for respecting UUM or RDM. The next section explores
a way of enriching the model in a way that allows us to articulate conditions
that do.
1.4 Solutions
Normative HOUs like B3i-iii are naturally understood as suggesting
that the question under discussion stack is inconsistent with the broader aims
or values of at least some of the conversationalists. This insight seems to
suggest that, in order to capture what is distinctive of HOUs, a model will have
to include a richer picture of interlocutor goals. Indeed, in Roberts (2012b) and
Roberts (2004), we see an acknowledgement of the way in which the “discourse
goals” represented by elements of the stack are situated within a larger set of
all goals had by any participant in the discourse. She points out that there is a
notion of relevance more general than the one targeted by her earlier account,
on which “A move m is Relevant at a given point in a collaborative, task-
oriented interaction if and only if it promotes the achievement of an accepted
goal of the interlocutors.” (Roberts (2012b), p. 9, bolding Roberts’).
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The contrast between this more general notion of relevance and that
aimed at by the Gricean maxim of relation is evident: on the more general
notion, an utterance might count as relevant even though it does nothing to
address the question currently under discussion. That this broader notion of
relevance has some currency in discourse is evident. Consider:
Wasp: We’re in the middle of a discussion of the differences be-
tween early and late Wittgenstein. Suddenly you say “Oh, there’s
a wasp on your arm.”
Knowing that a wasp has landed on my arm does nothing to answer our
erstwhile question under discussion of course, but this would hardly matter in
such a case; the goal of my not being stung by a wasp, which you presume
me to hold and cooperatively adopt as well, is mutually understood to take
temporary priority over the goal of reaching some insight into the Philosophical
Investigations.
But higher order utterances are not like the one made in Wasp; it’s
not that they are relevant in some extended sense of the term, but in the
very Gricean sense targeted by Roberts’ account. Their acceptability is not
a consequence of some shift in our environment, say, inducing a previously
non-salient shared goal to leap to the foreground. HOUs are relevant because
of the goals already salient in the conversation, not because of some other
domain goals.
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Nonetheless, stepping back and looking at the question stack as consti-
tuting a special subset of the broader set of interlocutor goals is necessary in
order to appreciate how the model needs to be augmented in order to reflect
the relevance of HOUs. An utterance can be related to a question as an an-
swer (full or partial) to either it or one of its subquestions. Questions can be
related to one another via sub-/super-question relations. But neither answer-
hood nor sub-/super-question relations take non-question goals as a relatum.
HOUs, meanwhile, sometimes have as their upshot that a bit of presumed in-
strumental reasoning which the current information structure is predicated on
is faulty. Here is a sketch of a solution that is responsive to this view of the
problem; while it won’t be the solution I ultimately adopt, considering it will
be instructive.
In line with the suggestion in Roberts (2012b) and Roberts (2004),
add to InfoStr a set of all the discourse participants’ shared goals10 and an
instrumentality relation on this set of goals. Add also a function that helps
characterize the way that the goals on the question under discussion stack
figure in the discourse participants’ overall structured set of goals; we might
think of this function as yielding the “G-profile” of a question. On this sug-
gestion, InfoStrD becomes 〈M,Q,A,<,Acc, CG,QUD,G,R, S〉 with new ele-
ments characterized asfollows:
8. G is the set of all goals shared by discourse participants.
10Roberts’ actual suggestion involves adding a set of all goals, shared or not. This is a
complexity I abstract away from in this sketch.
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9. R is a binary relation on G such that xRy just in case satisfying x is
(perceived as) instrumental11 in satisfying y.
10. S is a function from M to subsets of the transitive closure of R on G such
that the first relatum in each tuple is a question on the QUD stack at m,
i.e. to {〈x, y〉 : 〈x, y〉 ∈ transitive closure of R on G and x ∈ QUD(m)}
Note that Q is a subset of G and that the subquestion relation on Q will
be a subset of R on G; that is, where one question, q1 helps answer another,
q2, satisfying the goal of answering q1 is instrumental in satisfying the goal of
answering q2. Having added these elements to the model, we might revise the
original relevance conditions as follows:
relevance2: A move m is relevant iff m either introduces a partial
answer to the question under discussion, q, (m is an assertion) or
is part of a strategy to answer q (m is a question) or m alters the
G-profile of a question currently under discussion (i.e. S(mn) 6=
S(mn−1)).
While no doubt amplified by the terseness of the sketch, this approach’s
flaws are, I think likely to endure the sketch’s refinement. First, this approach
won’t address what I’ve called descriptive HOUs; an utterance which serves
merely to signpost or acknowledge an already accepted discourse structure
11I am giving no very detailed account of instrumentality here; I do assume that x’s being
instrumental in achieving y does not entail that achieving x is a necessary or sufficient
condition on y
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(e.g. “To review, we’ve been debating whether to approve the school board’s
budget and will next discuss the results of the by-election”) doesn’t alter the
way that the goals on the question under discussion stack figure in the discourse
participants’ overall structured set of goals. Second, this approach doesn’t by
itself address how HOUs should be dealt with by the QUD function. While
the approach can respect RLM and UUM, it doesn’t reflect the way in which
the move to higher order discourse constrains what comes thereafter; that is,
it doesn’t respect RDM. Finally, it introduces extensive additional apparatus.
This line of criticism is perhaps not too pressing; the addition of G, at least,
needn’t seem ad hoc if we appreciate the way it offers, inter alia, a way of
reflecting the effects of requests(Roberts (2004), p. 215). But the solution I
will propose makes G unnecessary for at least the purposes of representing the
information-structural dynamics of HOUs.
My augmentation of the model removes the QUD function and adds
an infinite set of QUD-like functions to the tuple that defines the information
structure of a given discourse:
InfoStrD = 〈M,Q,A,<,Acc, CG,QSet〉.
The functions in QSet (QUD1, QUD2... QUDn) admit of general defi-
nition:
7*. QSet is the set of all functions, QUDn, n > 0 and n ∈ N, such that:
(a) QUDn is a function from M to ordered subsets of Q ∩ Acc such
that, for all m ∈ M:
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i. For all q ∈ Q ∩ Acc, q ∈ QUDn(m) iff:
I. q <m
II. CG(m) doesn’t entail an answer to q and q has not been
determined to be unanswerable.
III. For all QUDn such that n > 1:
A. all p such that p ∈ q contextually entail a full or
partial answer to the ‘big question,’ or BQn: “What
is QUDn−1(m) like?”
(b) QUDn(m) is totally ordered by <.
(c) For all q, q’ ∈ QUDn(m), if q < q’, then the complete answer to
q’ contextually entails a partial answer to q.
Naturally, the subscript on a QUD function corresponds to the level
or ‘order’ of discourse with which the stack is associated. That is, 2nd order
utterances will answer questions generated by QUD2 and so on. The picture
here is one on which, even prior to the initiation of any higher order discourse,
there are multiple (infinite!) single-question QUD stacks always present, with
their initial question, as it were, auto-generated in a way that’s responsive to
the elements of lower order stacks at that point in discourse.
It may seem odd that this model countenances many more orders of
discourse than any normal discourse will involve; my expectation is that ad-
vancing as far as fourth-order discourse is rare and going beyond that practi-
cally unheard of. I regard this as analogous to the way that a grammar may
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countenance, say, center-embedding to an infinite depth, even though depths
past three are virtually nonexistent in corpora. In that case, as in the informa-
tion structural project here, the expectation is that some distributional data
will be explained by limits on processing capacity or some other constraint on
natural language use, rather than by the theory presently being offered. When
it comes to explaining the dearth of utterances of orders greater than 3, one
feels inclined to advert not only to speakers’ limited processing capacity, but
also to the limited interest that such discourse will hold for almost anybody.
A second worry might be that there’s no reason to think that the initial
questions of HO stacks are elements of Q ∩ Acc. If this worry is derived from a
concern that such questions just aren’t “moves” in the discourse at all, and so
not elements of M or, a fortiori, of Q, it should be susceptible to easy dismissal.
The success of the original proposal requires that we allow a question to be
an element of Q as a result of some accommodation process, as well as by
explicit utterance. The same thing must apply to higher order questions.
However, one might worry that the initial questions on HO QUD stacks are
still importantly dissimilar from questions that enter the first order QUD stack
via accommodation. Specifically, the initial questions on HO stacks have never
even been even passively “accepted,” and so might be regarded as failing to
be elements of Q ∩ Acc because of their not even being elements of Acc. That
an initial question might exist as the first constituent of a QUD stack before
the first move of its proprietary discourse level was made, and so prior to any
sort of acceptance of it seems possible is, however, entirely consistent with the
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original picture. On this picture, the initial question of QUD1, “What is the
world like?”, is a sort of boilerplate feature of contexts, existing before anything
is said at all. Whether Roberts (or, indeed, Stalnaker) would reconcile this
aspect of the view with 7 by arguing for a notion of acceptance on which
such boilerplate elements of discourse are tacitly accepted, or by adding an
exception to 7, I assume that I would be safe in making exactly the same
move when it comes to the initial questions on HO stacks.
With the above alterations made to the modeling apparatus, it will
perhaps be evident how I want to proceed to alter relevance1 in a way that
respects UUM and RDM. Recall that the original conditions on relevance were:
relevance1A move m is relevant iff, where q is the last element of (QUD(m)),
1. m introduces (directly or by implicature) a partial answer to q OR
2. m is part of a strategy to answer q
I suggest the following revision:
relevance3: A move mx is relevant iff, where mx−1 was of order n and
n∈ N,
1. mx introduces a partial answer to the last element in (QUDn(mx))
OR
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2. mx is part of a strategy to answer the last element in(QUDn(mx))
OR
3. mx introduces a partial answer to the last element in (QUDn+1(mx))
OR
4. mx is part of a strategy to answer the last element in (QUDn+1(mx))
OR
5. if mx−1 completely answered (or established as unanswerable) the
last element in (QUDn(mx−1)) and n > 1,
(a) mx introduces a partial answer to the last element in (QUDn−1(mx))
OR
(b) mx is part of a strategy to answer the last element in (QUDn−1(mx))
1-4 reflect ways in which an utterance can be relevant by answering or strate-
gizing to answer questions on the same stack as the prior utterance in the
discourse, or on the stack above this one. In short, 1-4 are meant to respect
RLM and UUM. 5 reflects the ways in, and circumstances under, which an
utterance can be relevant by answering or strategizing to answer a question
on a lower order stack than the one answered by the prior utterance. This
allows the model to respect RDM. Cases like B3i-iii then plausibly satisfy 3 or
4, either of which our new model predicts to be sufficient for relevance. This
is a correct prediction.
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Note that, unlike relevance2, this approach 1) deals appropriately
with both descriptive and normative HOUs, 2) addresses how QUD deals with
HOUs, and 3) uses a version of the same resources needed in order to appro-
priately handle first-order discourse to deal with higher order discourse.
A potential worry concerns how these conditions connect with the exact
specification of the “big-question” which we’re considering as a boilerplate fea-
ture of higher order question stacks. First, it should be clarified that “QUDn−1
is to be read de dicto; were it read de re, descriptive HOUs would be trivial.
Next, it might be worried that this formulation of the question excludes as
answers those utterances which clarify or acknowledge the content of the com-
mon ground (e.g. “so, you’re saying Ben did attend?”), which I had suggested
do number among HOUs. Whether the above formulation of the “big ques-
tion” does so depends on a detail about the nature of the elements of Q that
went undiscussed earlier. Where an uttered question is identified with a set
of propositions (and, equivalently, with the way this set of propositions parti-
tions a set of possible worlds), is the matter of which set of propositions that
is sensitive to the content of the common ground? That is, are the elements
of Q partitions i) on the total set of possible worlds, or ii) on the context
set? There are considerations that point in both directions, and settling this
detail is not generally necessary for this essay’s purposes. However, strictly
speaking the above candidate “big question” is not neutral with respect to i
and ii. In order for the proposed big question to be answerable by utterances
that describe the common ground, we need to suppose that the elements of
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Q (and so the output of QUD) are in accordance with ii. This is because,
where the elements of QUD(m) are partitions on CG(m), queries about what
QUD(m) is like will be partially answered by information about what CG(m)
is like, thereby bringing the otherwise excluded descriptive HOUs back into
the fold. We can however maintain neutrality between i and ii without loss
of our basic proposal, by offering an alternative to the above proposal which
implementations committed to i can adopt. On this alternative, the big ques-
tion is “What is QUD’n−1(m) like?” where we simply define QUD’ functions so
that they map elements of the QUD function of the same order (which will be
partitions on the entire set of worlds) onto partitions of the common ground
at m.
How does the QSet approach relate to the insight we started this section
with, that HOUs (of the normative variety anyway) characteristically comment
on the relationship of the first order stack to the broader aims or values of at
least some the conversationalists? Note that, where answering a question, q,
is instrumental in satisfying some further goal, g, then when q is on the first
order stack, the question “Is g appropriate/ worthwhile?” is a subquestion
of “Is q appropriate/ worthwhile?”. That is, a subquestion of BQ2 is “is
QUD1 appropriate/ worthwhile?” and where it a proposition in the common
ground is that the question(s) on QUD1 was motivated by g, and that a goal
is worthwhile only insofar as the further goal that motivates it is worthwhile,
the question “Is g appropriate/ worthwhile?” is contextually entailed as well.
In this way, there is space for questions’ connections to other goals to be
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reflected in our handling of HOUs without embellishing InfoStr to include
elements specifically for the representation of these other goals– so long as we
have resources for representing higher order questions.
To see this approach to HOUs in action, let’s walk through the way
that our revised model and relevance conditions handle B3i-iii12. Prior to any
of B3i-iii, the state of the common ground and QSet are as follows:
• Common Ground: CG(A3)
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2}
• QUD3: {BQ3}
• ...
B3i-iii update these elements of InfoStr as follows:
B3i: Alexia, this conversation is annoying.
Step 1: Add “Is (QUD1 such that) this conversation (is) annoying?” to
the top of QUD2.
• Common Ground: CG(A3)13
12I am assuming here that a single utterance effects a multi-step update (see Murray
(2014)) and that each step must satisfy relevance3.
13I am holding the common ground fixed through this step though, in fact, at some point
in the update effected by this utterance, the proposition that B3i was uttered will be entered
into the common ground as well
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• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is (QUD1 such that) this conversation (is)
annoying?”}
Step 2: Add to the common ground the proposition that the conversa-
tion is annoying and remove “Is (QUD1 such that) this conversation
(is) annoying?” from QUD2 to reflect its having been answered.
• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“This conversation is annoy-
ing”}
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is this conversation annoying?”}
B3ii: Alexia, Cara has a girlfriend.
Step 1: Add to QUD2 the question “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ use-
ful?”
• Common Ground: CG(A3)
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”}
Step 2: Add to the common ground the propositions that the reason
Alexia is interested in buying Cara cookies is an interest in winning
her favor romantically and that Cara’s having a girlfriend speaks
against this effort’s appropriateness or likelihood of success.
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• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“Alexia is interested in buying
Cara cookies because of an interest in winning her favor ro-
mantically”, “Cara’s having a girlfriend speaks against this
effort’s appropriateness or likelihood of success.”}
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”}
Step 3: Add to QUD2 the question “Does Cara have a girlfriend?”
• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“Alexia is interested in buying
Cara cookies because of an interest in winning her favor ro-
mantically”, “Cara’s having a girlfriend speaks against this
effort’s appropriateness or likelihood of success.”}
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”, “Does
Cara have a girlfriend?”}
Step 2: Add the proposition “Cara has a girlfriend” to the common
ground and remove “Does Cara have a girlfriend?” from QUD2 to
reflect its having been answered.
• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“Alexia is interested in buying
Cara cookies because of an interest in winning her favor ro-
mantically”, “Cara’s having a girlfriend speaks against this
effort’s appropriateness or likelihood of success.”}
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• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”, “Does
Cara have a girlfriend?”}
B3iii: Honestly, wouldn’t roses be better?
Step 1: Add to QUD2 the question “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ use-
ful?”
• Common Ground: CG(A3)
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”}
Step 2: Add to the common ground the propositions that Alexia is
interested in buying Cara cookies is an interest in winning her
favor romantically.
• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“Alexia is interested in buying
Cara cookies because of an interest in winning her favor ro-
mantically”}
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”}
Step 3: Add to QUD2 the question “would roses be better (for the
purposes of winning Cara’s favor)?”
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• Common Ground: CG(A3)∪{“Alexia is interested in buying
Cara cookies because of an interest in winning her favor ro-
mantically”}
• QUD1: {BQ1, “What kind of cookies does Cara like?}
• QUD2: {BQ2, “Is QUD1 appropriate/ good/ useful?”, “Would
roses be better (for the purposes of winning Cara’s favor)?”)}
In all three cases, the new model is able to reflect the way in which the
target utterance is intuitively shaping the information structure, and rele-
vance3 generates the correct verdict: all three utterances are relevant.
Having now laid my positive proposal on the table, I will confess to a
simplification that I made all the way back in §2. I represented it as an article
of Gricean doctrine that:
If an utterance, u, made at time, t, plausibly generates an impli-
cature with content i, then i must be relevant at t.
But this is not quite right– Grice thought this was untrue in cases
of “actual” violations of the maxim of relation. I’ve distorted the Gricean
record somewhat because I think that Grice’s distinction between “actual”
and “merely apparent” violations of relation is unmotivated, and in fact dam-
aging to his own theory. Note that in all cases of implicature except for those
of so-called “actual” violations of Relation, the Gricean says 1) that a broken
maxim triggers the search for an implicatum, and 2) that the search for this
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implicatum is then guided by the presumption that it will be a proposition
that is consistent with the apparently broken maxim. In the case of actual vi-
olations of Relation, however, the breach allegedly has the first effect without
the second. What then constrains the search space in a way that would make
it remotely possible to reason one’s way to the implicatum (or even a modest
range of plausible ones)? As always, some requirement that the implicatum
be such that the implicative utterance itself is plausibly helpful in reaching
it may constrain the search space to some extent. But without reference to
information structural features of broader context that make some proposition
more likely than others (doing which would smuggle 2 back in), it’s very dif-
ficult to see how implicatures are supposed to be derivable in cases of actual
violations of relation. This makes for an exacerbated case of Griceanism’s
habitual troubles with incalculability (see e.g. Davis 1998).
Given that distinguishing a class of implicature for which 2 is dropped
incurs this theoretical cost, why does the Gricean do it? Perhaps to appear
attentive to a disparity in the relevance (pre-theoretically conceived of) of the
implicata in the “merely apparent” and “actual” cases. But I confess that I
don’t myself see the implicatum in, say, Grice’s paradigm case of an actual
violation of Relation (see fn 5) as intuitively “irrelevant”. So this rationale
for the distinction seems likewise uncompelling. To the charge that I have
failed to target a notion of relevance exactly like what Grice had in mind
(and so have targeted something different from what Roberts probably had
in mind) when he composed his maxim of relation, I suggest then that I’ve
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adhered to the spirit of his project, rather than the letter. Where the maxims
were supposed to have genuine explanatory power with respect to implicature
derivation, the distinction between merely apparent and actual violations of
Relation is senseless. The account I’ve given allows a distinction to be drawn
without incurring the theoretical hardships that Grice’s did; what Grice called
actual violations of Relation are assimilable to the category of merely apparent
violations, and unique only insofar as their implicata are higher order14
Gossip
F1: I heard that Mary’s been looking for jobs elsewhere.
G1: I heard the same from Lisa in accounting.
H1: We shouldn’t be talking about this.
F2: Do you really think it’s inappropriate to engage in a bit of
harmless gossip?
G2: Her supervisor’s also been looking worried.
14Incidentally, this results in an interesting gloss on Gossip, which we noted earlier seemed
to involve something like what Grice called an actual violation of relation. It was apparent
that F1 and G1 were part of first order discourse, and H1 and F2 elements of second order
discourse. G2, which on its surface reverts to first order discourse, seems to carry the
implication that the foregoing discourse wasn’t worth having. This suggests that G2 effects
the following multi-step update of the discourse’s structure: 1) it adds to the top of QUD3
the question “Is the line of questioning on QUD2 worthwhile?”, 2) it answers this third
order question in the negative, 3) this third-order question being deemed answered, it strips
QUD3 back down to BQ3, 3) it strips all questions beyond BQ2 off of QUD2 to reflect the
third order commentary just issued, and finally, 4) with all higher order discourse reduced
to its boilerplate state it can address the question currently on the top of QUD1 without
actually violating RDM.
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1.5 Connections with Defective Discourse
I have introduced a set of functions, QSet, into the apparatus used
to model information structure and articulate relevance conditions. I want
to demonstrate that having multiple orders of QUD stack is independently
helpful for representing interlocutors’ information states in a particular kind
of defective discourse. A defective discourse is one marked by any devia-
tion from Perfect Communication, where a discourse satisfies Perfect
Communication iff, for each move in the discourse, the audience perfectly
understands the speaker’s specifically intended discourse update. A discourse
might be defective because an audience is confident about the speaker’s in-
tended update, but they’re wrong–call this misalignment)–or because the
audience just wasn’t sure about what the speaker’s intended update was–call
this uncertainty). Additionally, a discourse might be defective because the
speaker just doesn’t have a highly specific update in mind–call this nonspeci-
ficity. Each of these three kinds of defectiveness can be manifest at both the
level of propositional and structural updates15. Of note is that this third type
falls short of Perfect Communication while nonetheless being pervasive
in cases that we are typically happy to describe as successful communication.
My primary interest here is in drawing attention to an information structural
manifestation of this third kind of defectiveness and making some prelimi-
nary comments about how we should model it which suggest the use of the
15NB: As some of the foregoing discussion will make clear, all utterances effect both
propositional and structural updates.
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apparatus I’ve introduced above.
1.5.1 Information-structural Nonspecificity
Consider:
Real estate: Kahlil and Larry stand on the sidewalk in front
of their newly purchased fixer-upper property. Kahlil glances from
the broken windows to the collapsing doorframe to the massively
overgrown lawn. Larry says “Well?” to which Kahlil responds by
gesturing broadly around them and saying “A mess!”
What has been observed about cases like Kahlil’s utterance is that it’s
not clear what proposition an audience ought to update with on the basis
of his non-sentential utterance. What is reasonably clear is that candidates
include the following:
i. This house is a mess.
ii. The grounds are a mess.
iii. This whole property is a mess.
iv. Our situation is a mess.
However, it’s not clear that any of these is the right interpretation of
Kahlil’s utterance; it’s quite plausible in fact that Kahlil didn’t mean any par-
ticular one of them, while finding all of them more or less satisfactory. That
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non-sentential assertions often have this feature is an established observation
(see Buchanan (2010), Ferna´ndez & Ginzburg (2002), ?); non-sentential asser-
tions often admit of many plausible completions which the speaker would find
equally acceptable. But nor is non-sentential assertion the only possible locus
for this kind of nonspecificity; the domain of quantificational expressions is
often specifiable in multiple ways that yield the same extension at this world
and so are equally acceptable for most practical purposes, or else yield different
extensions equally consistent with the speaker’s intentions. And depending on
the extent of one’s contextualist leanings, very many other expressions (e.g.
comparative adjectives, counterfactual conditionals, propositional attitudes)
may likewise yield many equally satisfactory interpretations in a given utter-
ance.
What I am most interested in, however, is the way that nonspeci-
ficity manifests at the level of information structure:
Flowers: Frantically rushing around on the morning of his wed-
ding, Nelson asks Mariko “Have the flowers been delivered?”
Party: Orville and Priya have both been invited to an upcoming
party. They have previously discussed their concern with whether
they will know anyone there. They also know the guest list is quite
exclusive, and only those with invitations will be admitted. Finally,
they mutually know that Quinn is among their mutual friends.
Today, Orville approaches Priya and says, downcast, “Quinn didn’t
get an invitation to the party.”
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I offer two examples, because there are two distinct phenomena here.
Flowers bears an obvious relation to Real Estate; just as “the flowers”
would admit of several different completions were it to occur in an assertion
(the flowers that we ordered, the flowers that will be part of the wedding etc.)
so too does this expression’s presence in a question give rise to a multiplicity of
plausible, likely-to-be-satisfactory interpretations. And because this utterance
adds a question-under-discussion to the discourse, this multiplicity registers
at the level of information structure. That is, Mariko would do equally well
to update her information structural representation with the question “Have
the flowers we ordered been delivered?” or with “Have the flowers that will
be part of the wedding been delivered?” and Nelson might furthermore be
thought not to have intended one rather than the other, and to see both as
equally consonant with his intentions.
In Party, the issue may be less apparent; it’s true that we again have a
definite description (“the party”), but the multiplicity of plausible completions
of this definite description is not the issue here; this just shows that the already
described kind of nonspecificity is pervasive, and that it can combine with
the other. What I in fact mean to draw attention to is what we might call
deep information-structural desires which are attributable to Orville, where
an information structural desire is deep just in case it has as its object the
addition of more than one question to a single QUD stack. It may be obvious
that speakers have such deep desires in the sense that they sometimes have
a plan for the trajectory of the conversation; they intend to raise question x,
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then question y, and so on. But making sense of cases like Party, as well as
utterances like B3ii and B3iii, requires acknowledging that speaker intentions
sometimes have as their object the simultaneous16, rather than consecutive,
addition of multiple questions. I’ll spell this out in terms of Party and then
argue that this is the right interpretation of such cases.
“Quinn didn’t get an invitation to the party” implicitly adds a question
to the QUD stack. In order to be principled about the way in which we infer
implicit questions from assertions, we need to take any assertion that p, to
at least proffer (and, lacking objections from the audience, add) the polar
(yes/no) question of the form “Is it the case that p?” (cf. Simons, Beaver,
Roberts, & Tonhauser (2017)). It follows from this that one question which
Orville can certainly expect to see added on the basis of his utterance is q1:
q1: Did Quinn get an invitation to the party?
Now, note that where it is common knowledge that only those who re-
ceived an invitation may go to the party, as was stipulated, q1 is a subquestion
of q2:
q2: Will Quinn go to the party?
And where it is common knowledge that Quinn is friends with both
Orville and Priya, as stipulated, q2 is in turn a subquestion of q3:
16I take this simultaneity to consist in having multiple questions added by a single utter-
ance, but not to speak against these questions being added in separate update steps
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q3: Which of my friends will be at the party?
Which is in turn a subquestion of q4:
q4: Who will go to the party?
Now suppose that Orville’s ultimate goal is to discuss the answer to q3.
Moreover, his utterance was made with this goal in mind. That is, he would
ideally like Priya to have responded to his utterance by updating her QUD
stack with {q1,q2, q3 }. He would at least have liked to add more than one
question to the stack at once.
However, it is clear that Priya might fail to have understood Orville’s
desired update based on his actual utterance, and this may be reasonably clear
to Orville himself. This raises two questions: First, why think that the way
to understand the information structural desires of such a speaker is as I’ve
described? Second, what does this mean for the propositional attitudes of such
a speaker? And finally, how do we model what goes on in this kind of case?
One might charge that, rather than understanding a speaker like Orville
to be attempting to add multiple elements to the QUD stack at once, they are
simply adding one (q1) now, while maintaining an intention to add q2 and q3
in turn once q1 is successfully answered and so taken off the top of the stack.
The problem with this approach is that it represents the progression
through q1,q2, and q3 in a way equally appropriate to three entirely unre-
lated questions (i.e. questions between which no subquestion/ superquestion
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relations held). This fails to capture the logical relationship between these
questions, and the model fails to reflect the structure in virtue of which inter-
locutors are often able to anticipate the ends (i.e. superquestions) for which
speakers may be asking their subquestions. It also ends up generating some
false negatives with respect to relevance. Consider the following variation:
Party2: Priya asks, “Did Quinn get an invitation to the party?”
(q1) and Orville responds, “No, none of our friends are going.”
That “none of their friends is going” does entail an answer to q1, but
also provides additional information which does not help answer q1. Where
q1 but no other questions to which this additional information was an answer
was on the stack, this information would be irrelevant. Only by taking q3 to
be on the stack as well do we get the relevance of this information 17.
An alternative relevance-saving account of the above discourse would
suggest that Priya indeed succeeded only in adding q1 to the stack, but Orville
managed to answer q1, implicitly add q3, and answer it in one fell swoop. This
saves Orville’s utterance from seeming infelicitous. What this account still
17This sounds like, if anything, a classic example of a violation of the maxim of quantity,
so it may sound odd that I’m characterizing it as an apparent violation of relation. Which it
would count as depends on whether parts of an utterance (even of a single uttered sentence)
are assessed individually or jointly for relevance. The first part (“No”) of Orville’s utterance
does answer the question under discussion (q1), but the latter part does not. If these parts
are to be assessed for relevance separately, the second part is a violation of relation. If
they are assessed jointly (i.e. the relevance of the first part is enough to render the entire
utterance relevant) then the issue is that the latter part of the utterance seems superfluous
for the purposes at hand, and so like a violation of quantity.
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fails to reflect is that Orville’s addition of q3 is (I’ll make this stipulative here,
but not without thinking that this also describes a frequent reality) motivated
by the inference that Priya wanted to see q3 answered, and moreover that she
likely wanted such a desire to be recognized on the basis of her utterance of
q1. In short, it seems to get something wrong to attribute the addition of q3
entirely to Orville rather than Priya.
I’ll now address the second question mentioned above. I have above
been careful to speak of Priya as having wanted, rather than intended to add
q2 and q3 to the stack. This is because it is typically thought that a constraint
on intending to φ by ψ-ing is that one have a credence above a certain threshold
that one will succeed in φ-ing by ψ-ing, and in the sort of case I am discussing
it is an open question to Priya herself how confident she should be that she will
succeed in having her audience recognize her deep simultaneous information
structural desires on the basis of her utterance of q1. To be clear, there is
perhaps some fact of the matter concerning Priya’s credence, and so some fact
of the matter about whether she succeeded in intending. But I suggest that
it is fully coherent to suppose that speakers in Priya’s position don’t know
whether their hope was rational, and so don’t know whether they succeeded
in intending to have communicated their deep structural preferences. In fact,
there’s very little reason for a speaker to scrutinize the rationality of the hope
that their deep information structural desires will come across; should Orville
fail to grasp any more than q1, Priya will be able to add q2 and q3 thereafter,
and still achieve her discourse goals. This will not require making any moves
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that Priya would not have had to make in the first place, were she to have
explicitly unfolded her deep preferences up front. The fact that an imagined
scenario in which Priya did announce a number of nested questions up front
sounds ludicrous actually suggests that, insofar as you are convinced that
speakers ever try to simultaneously add multiple questions, they typically do so
in the “top-down” method whose use we’ve attributed to Priya (starting with
the smallest subquestion and anticipating inferences concerning underlying
super questions), rather than “bottom-up” (starting with the largest super-
question and proceeding to the smallest sub-question). Making utterances
with a questionably rational hope that they will achieve a simultaneous deep
update is a sort of very low-stakes hail-Mary; you might as well give it a shot,
since if it doesn’t work you won’t be any worse off than you were to begin
with, and if it does you’ve gotten your desires across more efficiently.
1.5.2 Multiplication and HO QUDs
The above was a long digression to establish the existence of the kind
of cases I think higher order QUDs will help us model. To review, in the
above case, Priya isn’t sure what inferences Orville might have made about
her information structural desires beyond her intention to see q1 answered. She
may be unsure whether Orville has the background beliefs in light of which q1
stands in the sub-question relationship to these further questions, or she may
think that he has these beliefs but may still fail to infer her desires (after all,
we fail to make inferences on the basis of information we do have all the time).
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Moreover, Priya is aware that Orville will be performing a related evaluation of
her information structural preferences, and, even if he is an avid inferrer of her
possible deeper interests, may be unsure which of these she in fact wanted him
to understand her to have on the basis of her uttering q1. Both speakers have
as their goal to represent all and only those information structures represented
by the other, and so Priya will take the sort of uncertainty that Orville is bound
to undergo under advisement. All of this suggests that Priya won’t be in a
position to know whether Orville has updated the QUD stack with {q1, q2,
q4}, {q1, q2}, {q1, q3}, {q1, q4}, or {q1} 18, or whether Orville might himself
feel unable to determine what it is most likely that Priya will think he has
updated with, and so similarly represent a plurality of options to himself.
The first response to this apparent plurality of information states for
each discourse participant is to suggest a proliferation of different QUD stacks
(of the first order alone) in Priya’s context representation, and indeed I think
this is on the right track19. I will call this move multiplication. In the
most general terms, multiplication is the representing of a given agent’s
information state using more than one region of modal space subject to inde-
pendent partition. But the exact procedure of multiplication raises several
questions. Below I represent a naive view of the multiplication process. I
then suggest how we might fix it.
18I am assuming that subquestionhood is transitive.
19As soon as we introduce defectiveness into the picture, individuating interlocutors’ in-
formation states rather than using a shared context becomes inevitable. The discussion here
is not implementation specific, but for a model that does this see the “dialogue game board”
approach in Ginzburg (2012)
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On this first version of the type of move I’m calling multiplication,
one first duplicates the context set so that an agent’s individual information
state features two copies of the context set (CS) (cf. von Fintel & Gillies
(2011)). The resulting collection of two CSs we might call the second order
context set. One then takes the first possible (set of) question(s) and partitions
the first copy of the CS according to it, before partitioning the second copy
according to the second possible (set of) question(s).
Context set (CS)
CS copy 1
“q1”
CS copy 2
CS1 partitioned by q1
CS2 partitioned
by {q1,q2, q3}
Figure 1.2: Multiplication, Version 1
But this can’t quite be right. Suppose that it becomes apparent that
the originally desired information structural update was {q1,q2, q3} (as in a
case of uncertainty) or that one speaker addresses q3, making it evident
that they are functioning as though they take this to be the case (as in cases
of nonspecificity); this should presumably trigger a contraction of CS2, so
that the CS copy partitioned by {q1} (alone) is excluded and only the copy
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partitioned according to {q1,q2, q3} remains– so far, so good. But now recall
what the context set was supposed to do: it was supposed to keep track of
what, for all the conversational participants knew (or committed to acting as
though they knew, or believed, or believed to be believed etc.) might be the
world they were in. While we primarily attend to the way that the context set
contracts in response to speaker-meant information, it can contract in response
to other information as well. It is typically assumed that some worlds are
excluded even at the beginning of the discourse because of the assumptions
one shares with one’s interlocutor. Moreover, if there’s suddenly a loud bang
outside the window while we have our conversation, that bit of information
rules out certain states of the world and so will contract the context set as well.
Here, then, is a further state of the world that we should expect the context
set to contract in order to reflect: that the question under discussion in our
conversation is x. According to the above version of multiplication, one
might contract CS2 without contracting the surviving CS to reflect the fact
that the it was now known (or decided) that the information structure of the
conversation was as implied by the partition on that CS. So, while information
structural updates impose a partition on the context set, they must also be
expected to effect a propositional update on the context set. Multiplication
must then actually look more like the following:
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Context set (CS)
CS copy 1
“q1”
CS copy 2
CS1
⋂ J{q1}
∈ QUD1K CS2
⋂ J{q1, q2,
q3} ⊆ QUD1K
CS1
⋂ J{q1}
∈ QUD1K
partitioned by q1
CS2
⋂ J{q1, q2,
q3} ⊆ QUD1K
partitioned by
{q1,q2, q3}
Figure 1.3: Multiplication, Version 2
The above is a basically adequate picture. I want to suggest though
that we can more parsimoniously represent these sorts of updates using the al-
ternative, independently motivated modeling apparatus developed earlier with
an eye to capturing the relevance conditions of higher order utterances. When
I am uncertain of the state of QUD1, a way of representing this uncertainty is
to partition the CS according to a second order question.
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Context set (CS)
“q1”
CS partitioned by the
2nd order question,
“What are the
elements of QUD1?
x is partitioned by
q1, where x= {w:
w ∈ CS and QUD1
is {BQ1, q1} in w}
y is partitioned by
{q1, q2, q3}, where
y= {w: w ∈ CS
and QUD1 is {BQ1,
q1, q2, q3 } in w}
Figure 1.4: Multiplication, Version 3
This version of the move may seem to have lost the feature in virtue of
which the previous two were intuitively characterize able as “multiplication”.
That is, it doesn’t involve the duplication of the context set; higher order QUDs
effectively take over the role of higher order CSs. It does however still estab-
lish two regions subject to independent partition, whereas there was previously
only one; hence, still a sort of multiplication. An appealing part of this pic-
ture is that the job of representing salient alternatives is managed entirely by
QSet, rather than being oddly and somewhat arbitrarily split between QUD
functions and various orders of context sets.
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1.6 Conclusion
This essay has characterized the class of higher order discourse and
drawn attention to the unique freedom that conversationalists have to make
this variety of utterance. The attempt has been to put our finger on the way
in which an influential implementation of the question-under-discussion ap-
proach to information structure lacked the resources to articulate relevance
conditions that made the right predictions about higher order utterances, and
to offer a solution. The proposed solution provides the additional benefit of
helping deal with an issue around the representation of defective discourses. In
the argument for this proposed solution, we considered an alternative account
on which an utterance’s higher order status was captured by its effect on G, the
total set of interlocutor goals. I concluded that this approach was non-ideal for
the purposes of characterizing higher order utterances so as to articulate rel-
evance conditions that were appropriately permissive toward them. However,
there is much to be explored concerning the other ways that a model enriched
along these lines can help represent the dynamics of HOUs. For instance, al-
though HOUs might be adequately characterizable in terms of their answering
higher order questions, representing the inferential procedures associated with
comprehending statements as higher order may turn out to require a special
field for the representation of goals, along the lines of G. This line of inquiry
also promises to show points of connection between HOUs and other linguistic
phenomena, like requests, pragmatic accounts of which make use of something
like a goal or preference ranking.
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Chapter 2
Luck and the Value of Communication
2.1 Introduction
This paper explores the analogy between communication and knowl-
edge. More precisely, it explores the analogy between the state characteristic
of the audience in a successful communication event and that characteristic
of the knower in a successful knowledge acquisition event. §2 and §3 examine
analogies in the analysis of communication and knowledge. We then apply
Jonathan Kvanvig’s (2003) argument about the value of knowledge (detailed
in §4) in §5’s discussion of the value of communication. An interesting out-
come of this process is the advancement of the thesis that communication is
not a uniquely valuable type of signaling event.
2.2 The Analogy
When an instance of communication takes place, one thing that hap-
pens is that the audience understands the speaker’s utterance. A very schematic
and preliminary characterization of what goes on with the audience, in suc-
cessfully communicative signaling events, is as follows:
A. she entertains that p
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B. i. she entertains that p because of the signal, and
ii. it is manifest to her that the speaker intended the signal to cause
her to entertain that p.
C. p is (consistent with) the content the speaker intended to get across with
the signal.
C notes what is uncontroversial, which is that communication involves
some kind of conformity of what the speaker entertains to what the speaker
wanted to express in the first place. I have included in C a parenthetical hedge
against some non-classical accounts of communication, but if this causes any
consternation, we can suppose that the sort of conformity relation between
the propositions considered by speaker and audience is just that of identity.
Something like B rules out cases where a speaker issues a signal intend-
ing to cause the audience to entertain that p, only for the audience to fail to
notice the signal at all but coincidentally entertain p just at that moment.
It also rules out cases where the signal causes the audience to entertain p
without also coming to see that this was the speaker’s intention. B doesn’t,
however, contain what would be needed in order to restrict cases of successful
communication to those of successful speaker meaning. This is intentional.
With Sperber & Wilson (1986, 2015), I think that, even in cases involving
two human beings1, our normal usage of the expression “communicates that
1That is, not just cases where we say things like “Those tree rings communicate that
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p” encompasses cases that involve showing evidence that p, as well as those
where someone meant that p, and that many cases of communication are on
a continuum between meaning and showing, as in the following examples:
When asked who is the tallest pupil in the class, the teacher points
to an individual who at first sight is the tallest in the class (al-
though some pupils might be absent) and says, “He is.” She both
means that the pupil she is pointing at is the tallest (since some
of the evidence for the intended conclusion comes from her inten-
tions), and displays direct evidence that he is the tallest. (Sperber
& Wilson (2015), p. 124)
Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation)
(Grice (1969), p. 170)
So whereas in the subset of cases of communication that involve suc-
cessful speaker meaning, the audience’s entertaining the target proposition has
to bear a more specific relationship to the signal and the speaker’s intentions
(see Grice (1957, 1969)), I think our normal evaluations about whether cases
the tree is x years old.” The above characterization of communication clearly fails to square
with these uses anyway, since the audience’s and speaker’s both being the kinds of entities
(e.g. humans, sophisticated non-human animals) who can have attitudes toward proposi-
tions (i.e. who can intend and entertain them) is built into it. I lean toward thinking that
communication can be naturalized to a greater extent than I do here; attitude-involving
cases of communication are probably construable as special cases of a phenomenon aptly
called communication in which at least the entity doing the communicating (the “speaker”)
needn’t be capable of propositional attitudes. I do suspect that many of the points I make
in this paper would be hard to make sense of if communication were not thought to es-
sentially involve an audience capable of propositional attitudes though. In any case, the
naturalization project is not one I pursue here.
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constitute communication suggest that communication per se doesn’t require
this. Sperber and Wilson think that “in all cases of communication, wherever
they fall on the meaning/showing continuum...the intended import is achieved
in the same way: by making mutually manifest one’s intention to make an
array of propositions manifest or more manifest to the audience.” (Sperber &
Wilson (2015), p. 139, Sperber & Wilson (2015), p. 50-54)2.
The above presentation of the conditions on communication is meant to
suggest an analogy between the audience’s half of a communicative transaction,
and knowledge. This analogy is natural because communication, like knowl-
edge, is a normative notion. It’s somewhat awkward to draw analogies between
knowledge and communication per se, because communication involves more
than one agent, and so more than one set of attitudes which one might fix
on as the analog of belief; but if we center our analysis of communication on
the audience, the analogy becomes clear and fitting. After all, knowledge too
had (prior to 1963) classically been taken to be correctly analyzed in terms
of three jointly-sufficient conditions which bear (more-or-less) neat analogy to
those listed above: justification, belief, and truth. Above, A is analo-
gous to belief, in that it specifies the bearing of some propositional attitude
to a content. C is analogous to truth; it specifies a directional fit relation
between the audience’s entertained content and that intended by the speaker
just as the truth condition does between the content of the knower’s belief
2For discussion of how this varies from the Gricean account of speaker meaning, see
Sperber & Wilson (2015), especially pp. 142-147
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and the world.
Lastly, B is the analog of justification. This point is a little more
complicated because exactly what justification comes to is of course a mat-
ter of longstanding dispute in the form of the intractable internalism/ exter-
nalism debate. On a rough characterization, sure to have run rough-shod over
distinctions important to some, internalism is the view that the features in
virtue of which a belief is justified (or not) are mind-internal, like the evi-
dence that one possesses. In contrast, externalism says that (at least some of)
these features are (at least partially) mind external, like the use of a partic-
ular belief-forming process, such as perception or memory, which is reliably
correlated with the reaching of true beliefs about the world. But, whether
specified in an internalist manner or an externalist one, what justification
does is put a constraint on how the belief is reached3. Like justification,
B (specifically Bi) places a constraint on how the content-attitude complex
specified in A (entertaining P) comes about.
It might be suggested that the audience’s side of a communicative trans-
action isn’t like knowledge– it just is an instance of knowledge. Certainly a
person can come to know things in the course of a communicative transaction.
It may well be not only common but necessary that they come to know what
the signal was like in order to come to entertain p because of it (as specified
in Bi). But this knowledge is instrumental in achieving communication, not
3To be clear, this is not posited as a sufficient condition on an account’s being one of
justification.
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constitutive of it. It’s also true that, under the right circumstances, the au-
dience can, as a result of the transaction, come to know that p; but this is a
highly contingent consequence of communication, not something constitutive
of it. On the above characterization, the audience must also come to know
that the speaker intended them to entertain that p, that the speaker issued the
signal with the desire that they, the audience come to entertain p, and so on.
The key observation though is that the attitude that the audience has toward
p which is constitutive of their having successfully received communication
of p, , is not that of knowledge. The relationship between that attitude and
knowledge is an analogical one.
Above, I endorsed a characterization of communication based on Sper-
ber and Wilson’s account. Even with the caveat that this characterization
is meant to capture communication in general, and not just cases of speaker
meaning, I think it is evident that counterexamples to the sufficiency of these
conditions arise. The next section discusses these and makes some suggestions
about their significance.
2.3 Communication and Luck
Historically, much philosophical concern with communication has been
a result of the fact that data about what constitutes communication seem
indirectly to place desiderata on a theory of meaning. Three closely related
schematic descriptions of this relationship between communication and mean-
ing that one sees at least tacitly endorsed in the literature are as follows:
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1. If A’s entertaining p in response to S’s utterance, u, is intuitively not an
instance of communication, then u didn’t (just) mean that p.
2. If A’s entertaining p in response to S’s utterance, u, intuitively is an
instance of communication, then u meant that p.
3. If A’s entertaining p in response to S’s utterance, u, intuitively is an
instance of communication, and A’s grasping p’ as a result of S’s ut-
terance, u, intuitively is not an instance of communication, and p’ differs
from p only in that p includes further information, f, (i.e. p and p’ are
a minimal pair) then f must be a part of the meaning of u.
For an example of this reasoning, consider the following case from Brian
Loar:
4. Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on televi-
sion is someone they see on the train evert morning and about whom, in
that latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stock-
broker’, intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith
to be referring to the man on the train. (Loar (1976), p. 357)
Prior to a recap of Loar’s handling of this case, let’s pause to observe
the pre-theoretic reasons one might provide for why this doesn’t seem like a
case of successful communication: Jones arrived at what Smith was getting at,
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but it was pure luck 4. Luckyness, it seems, undermines communication just
as it does knowledge. We’ll return to this theme below.
Having adduced this datum (a case paired with a negative judgment
of its constituting communication), Loar then brings this data to bear on the
debate between direct reference theorists and Fregeans: “Now Jones, as it
happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on television
is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. It
would seem that, as Frege held, some ’manner of presentation’ of the referent
is, even on referential uses, essential to what is being communicated” (p. 357).
This compresses a few steps of reasoning: it first applies something
like 1 to infer that a proposition having the form 〈a, the property of being a
stockbroker〉 where a is the man who is both on television and the train, is not
the whole meaning of Smith’s utterance, since the entertaining of that property
by Jones appears insufficient to render the case one of communication. Because
Loar goes on to offer a positive proposal about what Smith’s utterance meant
(indeed, the case was presented precisely to support this positive proposal),
we infer that the following case is tacitly proffered as the second member of a
minimal pair in which 4 is the first member:
5. Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on televi-
sion is someone they see on the train evert morning and about whom, in
4One notices that these attributions of luckyness have neither exactly the status of intu-
ition nor of theory; I take them to be a but of proto-theory
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that latter role, they have just been talking. Smith says ‘He is a stock-
broker’, intending to refer to the man on television; Jones takes Smith
to be referring to the man on the television.
Loar thinks that the difference between 4 and 5 is clearly that, in 4,
the audience, Jones, thinks of the man under a different mode of presentation
than does the speaker, Smith, whereas in 5 Smith and Jones think of the
man of whom stockbrokerhood is being predicated under the same mode of
presentation.
Buchanan (2014) charges that Loar’s case is not actually evidence
against direct reference views about the semantics of singular terms. In 4,
per Buchanan, Smith might well have wanted Jones to arrive at the proposi-
tion 〈a, the property of being a stockbroker〉 (where a is the man who is both
on television and the train), but he wanted him to do so on the basis of the
observation that a salient man in the signalling context was the man on the
television. Instead, Jones reached the same proposition but not on the basis
of this feature.
Here, Buchanan is developing a point also made in Grice (1969), that
an analysis of communication like the one give in the previous section, does
not provide jointly sufficient conditions because it clearly fails to rule out lucky
cases5. Speakers intend not just that their audience entertain p on the basis of
5“Comm.’, the initial characterization of communication that Buchanan criticizes, looks
slightly different than the characterization given by A-C above. One reason is superficial;
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the signal and understand this to have been the intention of the speaker, but
that they entertain p on the basis of some particular features of the signal and
understand the speaker to have intended this. Using a term favored by Schiffer
(see e.g. Schiffer (2017)), Buchanan refers to these features as inference base
features, or ib-features (pp. 63-64).
Buchanan’s point, though deployed against a particular instance of 1
and 3’s application, offers a very general objection to these principles’ legiti-
macy: communication can fail even where the audience ends up entertaining
the desired proposition, so neither of these principles goes through. One way
of thinking of Buchanan’s point is to say that, in addition to an object condi-
tion on communication, which is a type of condition that puts constraints on
what proposition(s) the audience must entertain, there is also a process con-
dition which is a type of condition that puts constraints on how the audience
arrives at the entertaining of the content specified by the object condition.
Loar’s mistake, on this gloss, is to have interpreted an intuitively failed case
of communication as having failed due to a violation of the object condition,
when really the failure was due to a violation of the process condition.
Peet (2017) points out though that Buchanan’s ib-feature requirement
Buchanan is really giving conditions on an agent’s intending to communicate, and so ef-
fectively centers the analysis of communication on the speaker, whereas A-C center on the
audience. My B condition however, based on Sperber and Wilson’s characterization of com-
munication, does not map perfectly onto Comm. There is obviously a much more extensive
discussion to be had about the how we should arbitrate between these views, but luckily the
respects in which my baseline characterization and Buchanan’s differ will not be significant
for the point I ultimately want to make.
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(IBFR), while working nicely to exclude some lucky cases, still admits others.
He offer the following case as evidenceL
6. Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on televi-
sion is someone whom they see on the train every morning. Smith says
‘He is a stockbroker’, intending to refer to the man on television; Jones
recognizes that Smith is drawing upon their common knowledge that
there is a salient man on the television screen; but, seeing the similarity
between the man on the television and the man whom they often see
on the train, he thinks that Smith, who he assumes also recognizes the
similarity, is talking about the man whom they see on the train. Now,
Jones, as it happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the
man on television is the man on the train; but he has failed to understand
Smith’s utterance. (p. 381)
One might think that this doesn’t show us that Buchanan is wrong
to posit an IBFR on communication; this case just shows us that speakers’
ib-feature intentions are normally more numerous or demanding than those
we have associated with this particular case. Perhaps we just ought to have
posited more ib-features in cases basically like Loar’s (4-6) than we did above.
As Peet sees it though, the problem with this line of thought is that “we can
always construct a case in which the audience recognizes all of the speaker’s
intended ib-features, and follows the intended inferential path as far as it goes,
but then deviates wildly in such a way that they could easily have failed to
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recover the correct referent were it not for some coincidence” (Peet (2017), p.
381). The audience’s routing their interpretive inferences through the elements
of any posited set of ib-features, so long as that set specifies an inferential
path that is less than maximally demanding–that is, so long as it stops short
of specifying an exact and exhaustive set of inferential steps that the audience
is to pass through–will not be enough to insulate them against communicative
luck.
For the addition of IBFR to A-C to render these conditions jointly
sufficient then, it would have to be the case that speakers do typically have
such maximally demanding ib-feature intentions. But they don’t. Here is a
case adapted from one in Heck (2014) (p. 337) that Peet uses to make this
point:
6. Della and Kirsi are waiting in line outside a restaurant. Out of the
blue, Della says, ”Man, he was funny.” Kirsi knows exactly who she is
referring to: a man who had been doing stand-up on a corner when they
were walking over earlier.
What ib-features did Della have in mind in finding the referent for
‘he’? That she, Della, was likely still to be thinking of the comedian? That
the most salient funny person was the guy they had recently seen on that
corner? One can imagine that Della might have constructed her utterance
with one of these in mind (though it doesn’t seem necessary that she had any
preference between them), but even supposing she did, I at least don’t have the
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intuition that Kirsi’s identifying the referent via the alternative route would
have undermined their transaction’s status as communication. Note that this
doesn’t amount to my being, after all, tolerant of a little luck in my cases of
communication: it just doesn’t strike me that Kirsi’s process for arriving at
the semantic value of ‘he’ wasn’t particularly lucky. What it does mean is
that a version of the IBFR which required associating maximally demanding
ib-features to speakers is too strong, even as any version of an IBFR that
was less than maximally demanding seems to leave room for communication-
undermining luck.
To recap, 4 was a kind of Gettier case for communication; the case
satisfied the conditions of our prior analysis of communication, but seemed
not to be a case of communication due to some luckyness in it. This presents
the project of offering a candidate fourth condition which, together with A,
B, and C, will be jointly sufficient for a case’s being one of communication. In
pursuing this project, it is natural to ask whether the candidates that catch
our eye are clear analogs of candidates that have likewise been put forward
(and then cast aside) in the last half century of literature on the analysis of
knowledge. Of course, simply because some candidate fourth condition on
communication is analogous to a failed fourth condition on knowledge, does
not entail that the former too will certainly be a failure. I think it’s clear that
communication and knowledge are analogous, but there are differences, and
these differences may well be relevant to how well a candidate fourth condition
fares. Nonetheless, I think the analogy between knowledge and communication
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is strong enough that we might anticipate something like this. Peet’s criticism
of Buchanan’s IBFR has already suggested that finding a satisfactory fourth
condition may not be all that simple. But should we expect it to be as hard
as solving the Gettier problem?
To play this idea out a bit, let’s observe that an IBFR is closely re-
lated to the ‘no-false-lemmas’ (NFL) response to the Gettier problem (see
e.g. Clark (1963)). NFL requires that the process one uses to form a belief
passes through no falsehoods. As discussed when developing the analogy of
condition C to truth above, as truth is to knowledge, so is the consistent-
with-speaker-intentions relation to communication. Thus, it’s to be expected
that the communicative version of NFL would involve some sort of proscrip-
tion around passing through unintended steps rather than false steps. And
indeed, variations on an IBFR require that: the process used to reach P pass
through all the elements of a certain set of steps (i.e. those specified by the
speaker’s intended ib-features), or that it pass through only elements of such
a set, or through all and only these elements etc.
A failing of the NFL condition is that it doesn’t exclude cases like Alvin
Goldman’s “fake barn country” example:
7. ...unknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of papier-
maˆche´ facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly
like barns, but are really just facades, without back walls or interiors,
quite incapable of being used as barns. They are so cleverly constructed
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that travelers invariably mistake them for barns. Having just entered the
district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is
a genuine barn. But if the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry
would mistake it for a barn. (Goldman (1976), p. 773)
Goldman, and many with him, have the intuition that in this case
Henry does not know that the structure in front of him is a barn, despite
having a justified true belief that he moreover passed through no falsehoods
in forming. So much for NFL.
Here’s a stab at a communicative analog to Goldman’s case, to see if
it poses the same sort of problem to IBFR that 7 did to NFL:
8. The people in this town all suffer from an unusual neurological con-
dition affecting their speech: they involuntarily utter the sentence “It’s
snowing!” over and over, doing so with no communicative intention what-
soever. It is not only possible, but a frequent occurrence, that visitors
passing through believe residents to be trying to communicate when they
are not. Janette has just stopped in town to get gas, knowing nothing
about the place. A resident at the pump next to her looks around and,
observing the weather, voluntarily (indeed, with communicative inten-
tions) observes to her that“it’s snowing!” Janette understands him, and
correctly takes him to have intended to communicate in saying what he
did.
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Was this an instance of communication? My own intuitions about
this are about as negative as they are for 4. This suggests that, along with
the surface similarity between IBFR and NFL, they can be demonstrated
to be inadequate fourth conditions on their respective target phenomena by
analogous counterexamples.
A full inquiry into the analogies between the fourth conditions on
knowledge and communication might look closely at whether seeming similar-
ities persisted through the dialectic around other candidate fourth conditions,
like security (Nozick (1981)) or safety (Sosa (1999)). As will be apparent, the
point I want to make in §5 doesn’t rely on their being no viable fourth con-
dition on communication, but on whatever that viable condition is looking ad
hoc from the point of view of the value of communication.
2.4 The Value of Knowledge
This exploration of the analogy between knowledge and communication
turns now to question of their respective values. As concerns knowledge, the
seemingly intractable issue of establishing a way of Gettier-proofing an analysis
has important consequences for the issue of knowledge’s value.
The history of epistemology has regarded knowledge as its central target
of inquiry, and so at least implicitly suggested that knowledge is the most
valuable type of epistemic state. But 1) why is knowledge more valuable than
true belief? And 2) why is knowledge more valuable than justified true belief?
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My real interest here will be in Jonathan Kvanvig’s (2003) response
to the second of these questions. But to understand how he responds to the
second, we need to understand his answer to the first.
The first question goes back to at least Plato who, in the Meno, had
Socrates and his interlocutor discuss why one would should prefer a guide who
knows their way to Larissa over one who merely has true beliefs about how to
get there. Where knowledge is understood, as it was by Plato, to be justified
true belief, this question comes done to what value is added to a true belief
by justification.
Answers must navigate an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, where
the value of a belief’s justification is derived from its being instrumental in
reaching truth, a belief that is already true would seem to have nothing left to
gain from justification (see e.g. Kvanvig (2003) pp. 44-60, Zagzebski (2004));
this gets called the “swamping problem”. But, on the other hand, if the value
of justification is not derived from that of truth somehow, its hard to say why
the value in question is epistemic in nature.
Kvanvig, at least, thinks that certain accounts of justification’s nature
can provide satisfying accounts of its value and so survive this puzzle. One
such account is a kind of subjective internalism, on which a belief is justified
just in case it was formed according the agent’s own standards for truth-
conducive inferential patterns. How does this view escape the first horn of
the above dilemma? Bear in mind that a belief’s being subjectively justi-
fied doesn’t necessarily make it more likely to be true; the agent might have
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some wild personal standards for how to form true beliefs. Even for such an
agent though, the epistemic value of their justification is secured because of its
bearing a relationship to truth; justification still reflects the agent’s “adopting
intentional means to the goal of truth.” Thus: “[this kind of] justification is
extrinsically valuable in virtue of its relationship to the truth, though it is not
instrumentally valuable on the basis of its relationship to truth.” (Kvanvig
(2003), p.200)
Setting aside the first problem now, the trickier problem is that of
why knowledge is more valuable than justified true belief. The only difference
between knowledge and true belief is that knowledge involves the satisfaction
of some fourth condition to rule out Gettier cases. The exact nature of this
fourth condition is, as discussed in the previous section, extremely elusive.
Of the many candidate fourth conditions put forward, Kvanvig makes the
following observation:
In each case, such approaches offer something of value that might
be used to explain the value of knowledge, but each such ap-
proach faces immediate difficulty concerning the nature of knowl-
edge. Counterexamples to the initial formulation of the approach
force alterations in the approach, and the alterations are guided
exclusively by concern over the nature of knowledge, resulting in
emendations of the original suggestion that appear entirely ad hoc
from the point of view focusing on the question of the value of
knowledge...When we look carefully at the variety of failed at-
tempts to satisfy the twin desiderata concerning the nature and
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value of knowledge, we do not find signs of progress. We find, in-
stead, a repeated pattern in which progress with respect to one
desideratum is balanced by greater weakness with respect to the
other. (Kvanvig (2003) pp. 138-139)
Kvanvig needn’t be read as pessimistic about the possibility of eventu-
ally finding an fourth condition which, together with the three classical ones,
generates all and only the right predictions about which cases count as knowl-
edge. He just thinks that the evidence thus far suggests that this condition,
whatever it is, will describe the presence of some highly gerrymandered fea-
ture that adds no clear value above that of justified true belief. So whereas
he thinks that the first of the problems concerning the value of knowledge is
answerable by some accounts of justification, Kvanvig thinks this second prob-
lem is unsolvable: knowledge really has no value over that of a proper subset
of its components.
This conclusion leaves the throne empty, as it were. Some other phe-
nomenon might be recognized as having supreme value among epistemic states,
and the candidate Kvanvig puts forward is understanding. Understanding, like
knowledge, is an attitude that is factive (i.e. to understand that p entails that
p is true; to understand an object, o, entails having true beliefs about o).
Additionally:
...understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and other
coherence-making relations in a large and comprehensive body of
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information. One can know many unrelated pieces of information,
but understanding is achieved only when informational items are
pieced together by the subject in question. One might even propose
a more radical thesis... Whereas knowledge can have as its object
individual propositions, understanding may not. It may be that
when understanding is achieved, the object of understanding is an
‘informational chunk’ rather than a number of single propositions.
(Kvanvig (2003) p. 192)
But understanding is not just knowledge of a bunch of closely related
propositions plus the knowledge that they are related: “although knowledge
is incompatible with a certain kind of epistemic luck, understanding is not”
(Kvanvig (2003), p. 199). Understanding, unlike knowledge, is invulnerable to
being undermined by Gettier cases. Here is a case that Kvanvig thinks makes
this idea intuitive:
Consider, say, someone’s understanding of the Comanche domi-
nance of the souther plains of North America from the late sev-
enteenth until the late 19th centuries. Suppose that if you asked
this person any questions about this matter, she would answer cor-
rectly. Assume further that the person is answering from stored
information; she is not guessing or making up answers, but is hon-
estly averring what she confidently believes the truth to be. Such
an ability is surely constitutive of understanding, and the experi-
ence of query and answer, if sustained for a long enough period
of time, would generate convincing evidence that the person in
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question understood the phenomenon of Comanche dominance of
the southern plains. But does she have knowledge? Ordinarily,
yes; but it is not required. For, on the usual theories of knowl-
edge, all those answers could be given from information possessed
and still fail to be known to be true, because the answers might
only be accidentally true. For example, most history books might
have been mistaken, with only the correct ones being the sources of
understanding in question, and with no basis in the subject for pre-
ferring the sources consulted over those ignored. (Kvanvig (2003),
pp. 197-198)
Notwithstanding having been Gettiered in the process of acquiring all
her true beliefs about Comanche history, Kvanvig thinks it’s intuitive that this
agent understands that history, even while lacking much knowledge about it.
Whether or not it’s intuitive to use the term “understanding” to refer
to this luck proof phenomenon strikes me as relatively unimportant to Kvan-
vig’s goals. What’s more important is that the phenomenon that the label
“understanding” is here stuck to is one that strikes us as valuable. But nor
should a conclusion of its value, or value relative to knowledge, be expected
to be a deliverance solely of intuition. Knowledge, Kvanvig claimed, was only
as valuable as justified true belief. Why is understanding more valuable than
this? He explains that
...understanding is valuable because it is constituted by subjec-
tively justified true belief across an appropriately individuated body
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of information that is systematized and organized in the process of
achieving understanding, and subjectively justified true belief that
is systematized in this way is valuable (p. 202)
We recall that subjective internalism was the view of justification that
Kvanvig thought survived the challenge presented by the first value problem for
knowledge. This sort of justification was deemed valuable because it amounted
to the “adopting [of] intentional means to the goal of truth” and so bore a
relationship, but a non-instrumental one, to the property of central epistemic
concern, truth. The view about understanding then appears to be that it
involves a layer of “intentional means to the goal of truth” on top of that
involved in the justification of individual beliefs. Systematizing and organizing
one’s true beliefs is not necessarily instrumental in reaching the truth, but it
is a way that one intentionally pursues the truth. Understanding a body of
information thus involves an extra connection, or subjective commitment, to
getting the truth, beyond that involved in the justification of all the true beliefs
that constitute the nodes in that body of information.
2.5 The Value of Communication
As with knowledge, we can distinguish two different value problems for
communication. The first asks what value it has for an audience to entertain
the speaker’s intended content, p, on the basis of the signal and with its being
manifest to her that the speaker intended the signal to cause her to entertain
that p (or however one wants to spell out the B condition), over and above the
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value of their entertaining the speaker’s intended content. That an audience
has come to entertain what they have on the basis of the signal might be
thought to be conducive to their entertaining the content the speaker had
in mind, but where they were already doing this, the satisfaction of the B
condition seems to add nothing; this is the swamping problem, re-emerging
with respect to communication.
One might think though that the other horn of the dilemma we saw in
the above presentation of the first value problem for knowledge doesn’t have
an analog here; whereas we were concerned that some attributions of value
to justification wouldn’t cast it as valuable in any distinctively epistemic way,
what is the proprietary domain of value for communication and any one of
its components whose value we might assess? I say that this is the domain
of signaling. This domain, like the epistemic domain, is normative in that it
is goal-oriented: in the epistemic domain the fundamental goal is truth, and
in the signaling domain the fundamental goal is (something like) information
transfer. If this is so, then we can articulate the second horn as follows: if the
value of B isn’t related to the transfer of information, it’s not clear how its
value is distinctively signaling-oriented.
As the goal of this paper is to sort of stick with an analogy and see
how far it gets us, we now construct a response to this apparent dilemma that
mirrors Kvanvig’s concerning subjective internalist justification. Whatever the
precisely correct specification of the B condition is, it will be something that
isn’t necessarily instrumental in information transfer, but which represents
78
an intentional commitment on the audience’s part to facilitating information
transfer. B thus adds a distinctively signal-oriented value to A and C.
On to the second problem of value for communication. If problems with
luckyness are, as we suggested above, likely to be as persistent for communi-
cation as they are for knowledge, and if one finds Kvanvig’s above response
to the second value problem for knowledge compelling, it is natural to wonder
how a similar response might play out with respect to communication. That
is, perhaps we think that, the closer we get to a fourth condition on commu-
nication that genuinely excludes lucky cases, the more ad hoc this condition
will come to seem from the point of view of communication’s value. So we
should take it that all the value in communication resided in the proper subset
of its components enumerated in A-C above; just as Kvanvig concluded that
knowledge is not a uniquely valuable epistemic state, we might conclude that
communication is not a uniquely valuable signaling achievement.
Well, goes one line of criticism, whoever said it was? Knowledge has
been a central target of inquiry in philosophy for the discipline’s entire history,
hence the case for there existing a presumption of its importance that it might
be interesting to reject. Why think there’s any such general presumption with
respect to communication, a phenomenon whose philosophical consideration
has so often been secondary to an interest in more central phenomena like
meaning? Here it’s worth noting that the first value problem for knowledge
gets off the ground in the Meno without appealing to a philosophical tradition
of revering knowledge; the folk seem to care a lot about knowledge, and it’s
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from their concern that the presumption of knowledge’s unique value derives its
force. I think it’s likewise clear that the folk care a lot about communication,
and so I think it’s counterintuitive enough to be worth noting if communication
turns out not to be uniquely valuable.
Let’s now consider what the analog of understanding might be with
respect to signaling6; understanding was true justified belief about a bunch of
related pieces of information, plus some grasping of the connections between
these, but without an anti-luck criterion. Let’s stipulatively label our targeted
analog comprehension. Comprehension involves in fact satisfying A-C with
respect to a bunch of closely related signaling events– a “chunk” of signaling
events, to recall Kvanvig’s language– and grasping the connections between
these.
Now, the kind of entity which it is natural to identify as such a chunk
is a discourse. And one natural suggestion about what it is to grasp the con-
nections between the moves in a discourse is that this amounts to tracking the
information structure of that discourse. But just as there were no constraints
put on the kind of connections between individual facts the appreciation of
which could constitute understanding, we needn’t confine comprehension to
6An unfortunate confusion is liable to arise because ‘understanding’ is a natural term to
use for what it is an audience does i successful cases of communication, whereas here I want
to talk about understanding qua putatively privileged epistemic phenomenon. Now what
the audience does in cases of successful communication may incidentally be an instance of
understanding in Kvanvig’s sense (indeed, it seems he doesn’t think his sense is a techni-
cal one), but it’s important here to recall that we’re examining an analogical relationship
between what communicatively successful audiences have and knowledge, not an identity
relationship between what these audiences do and understanding
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an appreciation of the kind of relations between discourse moves that nor-
mally make their way into an account of information structure. A recognition
of deep motivational connections between moves in a discourse too might con-
tribute to comprehension.
Comprehension will subvert communication as the most valuable state
in the domain of signaling, because it involves a greater intentional com-
mitment to information transfer. This follows from the fact that drawing
information-structural and deep-motivational connections between moves in a
discourse is a way of committing oneself to information transfer.
2.6 Conclusion
In much of this paper, I have plowed ahead with the analogy between
knowledge and communication while doing relatively little to point out any
disanalogies. I think this has been a legitimate enterprise; assigning oneself a
position (that these two things are next to perfectly isomorphic) and observing
what kind of moves one would want to make in order to press that claim is
one way of getting an initial sense of the dialectical possibilities in a region.
Further thinking in this area will naturally involve probing this analogy more
critically.
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Chapter 3
This Machine Kills Fascists: Detecting
Propaganda with Formal Models of Mass
Discourse Structure
3.1 Introduction
Democracies’ primary defense against existentially threatening propa-
ganda is inoculation of their constituents against propagandistic manipulation.
But in any attempt to perform this inoculation, a familiar problem emerges:
those with differing ideologies will disagree about which messaging is threat-
ening in this way. If, as many suggest, propaganda is essentially that which
undermines a polity’s ability to rationally deliberate on questions of public
importance, this disagreement is about what rational deliberation looks like.
Those on the political right may argue that the left’s rationale for a minimum
wage is so faulty as to count as undermining rational deliberation; those on the
left may suspect the same of the right’s rationales for mandatory minimum
sentencing for non-violent drug crimes. It would be useless to suggest that
any faction be privileged in their ability to dub others propagandistic merely
for promoting kinds of inference which they find unsound; such a designation
would influence the public only along ideological lines and so systematically
fail to reach those actually in thrall to propaganda– whether this be a subset
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of the public or virtually all of it in some way or another. So much, one might
then think, for the prospects of a non-partisan effort to identify propaganda.
I propose a way of identifying propaganda that is less vulnerable to
this problem. This method argues that a certain kind of mass discourse po-
larization is functionally propagandistic. Drawing this connection between
polarization, a structural feature of mass discourse, and propaganda allows us
to abstract away from the particular content of political messaging in our des-
ignations of propaganda. It is therefore a way of identifying propaganda that
is, at least in theory, immune to the siren’s song of partisan condemnation.
In what follows, I first develop this conceptual link between propaganda
and polarization (§2). I then elucidate the notions of mass discourse and of
discourse structure alluded to above (§3). I connect these two notions with a
novel way of representing and analyzing the structure of mass discourses. From
here I lay out my proposed formalism for modeling mass discourse structure
and introduce two indices which represent the levels of propagandicity, of the
kind I characterize in §2, in a modeled mass discourse (§4). I then connect the
operationalization of propaganda at work in my model to the norm of public
justification and to propaganda’s non-epistemic dimensions (§5). I close with
a prospectus on the next steps of the project.
3.2 Propaganda and Polarization
Many are likely to feel about propaganda as Justice Stewart did about
pornography: we don’t have a definition ready at hand but we “know it when
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we see it.” Those cases of propaganda that we tend to take as paradigmatic
work via conspicuous mechanisms: explicit assertion; exaggeration of nega-
tive or positive traits in the subject of visual depiction; emotionally evocative
slogans. Nazi posters caricature Jews and proclaim that, Der ist Schuld am
Kriege! (The war is his fault). Contemporary pro-natalist campaigns in Italy
depict a white, plausibly ethnically Italian woman, one hand on abdomen, one
holding an hourglass, and declare that, La bellezza non ha eta`, la fertilita` s`ı
(Beauty has no age, fertility does). Reconstruction-era ads from the former
confederate states of the US depict black freedmen indolently consuming the
fruits of white laborers’ toil; as sexually aggressing against white women; or
else as succumbing to lynching at the hands of a klansman in vaguely Greco-
Roman dress.
What theorists have tended to identify as distinctive in both subtle and
flat-footed forms of propaganda is its effect on both the information and the
methods that polity-members use in their process of political belief formation.
On what Jason Stanley calls the “classical sense,” propaganda is “manipu-
lation of the rational will to close off debate” (Stanley (2015), p. 48, italics
Stanley’s own). Jacques Ellul characterizes propaganda as “A way to obtain
power thanks to the support of psychologically manipulated groups or masses,
or to use this power in putting pressure on the masses” (Ellul (1973), transla-
tion mine). And Randal Marlin defines it as “the organized attempt through
communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audi-
ence in ways that circumvent or suppress an individual’s adequately formed,
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rational, reflective judgment” (Marlin (2002), p. 22).
That there is some kind of connection between polarization and pro-
paganda is suggested by the fact that polarization too is often distinguished
by its characteristic negative epistemic effects. To make the case for their
connection really compelling, we’ll drill down a bit on the nature of political
polarization.
3.2.1 Varieties of Political Polarization
Political polarization is very generally thought of as political division or
disagreement that is deep, intractable, and systemic. Exact operationalizations
of this notion vary concerning the traits with respect to which agents of a
polarized society are clustered into their estranged camps1. A few sample
operationalizations, falling into three broad categories, are as follows:
1. Network Polarization
(a) Two or more distinct clusters of polity-members exist with respect
to political information sourcing (e.g. Davis & Dunaway (2016)).
(b) Two or more distinct clusters of polity-members exist with respect
to inter-agent communication (e.g. Pattie & Johnston (2016)).
2. Doxastic Polarization
1A cluster is a concentration of agents associated with the same value vis-a`-vis a cate-
gorical variable, or associated with relatively similar values vis-a`-vis a continuous variable
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(a) The existence of a two-peaked (bimodal) rather than single-peaked
(unimodal) distributions of policy views across a political spectrum
(e.g. Fiorina et al. (2005), Ansolabehere et al. (2006), Glaeser &
Ward (2006), Fiorina & Abrams (2008))
(b) Individual political agents’ ideological commitments are (on aver-
age) extreme relative to an appropriate reference point (e.g. per-
haps Abramowitz & Saunders (2008)).
3. Affective Polarization
(a) Individual political agents show, on average, high levels of antipa-
thy toward opposing ideologies and/ or those who hold them rel-
ative to an appropriate reference point (e.g. Iyengar & Westwood
(2015)).
Moreover, each of these operationalizations can be applied to the mem-
bers of a polity very generally, or to particular groups, such as political elites,
media outlets, or the political laity. Media polarization is particularly inter-
esting, because where two or more distinct clusters of media outlets/ major
information venues exist with respect to ideological skew, this looks like dox-
astic polarization with respect to members of the media themselves. But the
media’s doxastic polarization is clearly closely related to a form of network
polarization for members of the polity more generally who may access me-
dia outlets selectively and who rely upon them for their political information.
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Many of these kinds of polarization will be partially co-constitutive, correlated
or causally intertwined, and whether and how high levels of polarization within
a polity are concerning, or even interesting, will depend on which operational-
ization(s) we work with.
Beyond the varieties of polarization described above, I suspect there
is another variety of polarization worth attending to in what I will be calling
deliberative polarization. On my characterization, deliberative polarization is
a state of affairs in which clusters of agents within a population (say that of
an entire polity) think though some target issue or range of issues in highly
divergent ways. Put slightly differently, deliberative polarization is a particular
pattern of deliberative strategy variation (DSV) across a population.
To be clear, I am staking no claim to deliberative polarization’s be-
ing the right analysis of polarization simpliciter, but to its being a kind of
polarization whose study is motivated by the reasons typically mustered to
motivate the study of polarization more generally. I take it that there are
two broad classes of reasons to be interested in political polarization. First,
there is the worry that political polarization has negative effects concerning the
efficiency and responsiveness of a polity’s governing structures: legislative grid-
lock, an erosion of the separation of powers, and, together with the fact that
many American judicial positions are filled by election, an undermining of the
judiciary’s counter-majoritarian character (Abramowitz & Saunders (2008);
Fiorina et al. (2005); Davis & Dunaway (2016); Pattie & Johnston (2016)).
Second, there is the concern that polarization just constitutes a breach in some
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vital feature of a polity.
Something like this latter concern is one I take to follow from certain
versions of deliberativism in democratic theory. The basic notions of deliber-
ative democratic theory are familiar ones. One fairly typical expression of the
view is offered by Ju¨rgen Habermas as follows:
...the attempt to arrange a society democratically...is a question
of finding arrangements which can ground the presumption that
the basic institutions of society and the basic political decisions
would meet with unforced agreement of all those involved, if they
could participate, as free and equal, in discursive will-formation
(Habermas (1979), p. 186).
Deliberative democracy, as a normative theory, says that policy deci-
sions being reached (or reachable) via deliberation among a relevant set of
political actors is either conducive to, or a necessary condition on, the legit-
imacy of that policy. That this characterization is vague in some spots and
disjunctive in others is an artifact of the attempt to be maximally ecumenical.
Most theories of deliberative democracy don’t posit the actual formation of
a consensus as a necessary condition on legitimacy; rather, such a consensus
is a sort of regulatory ideal, or else it is the hypothetical capacity to pro-
vide (theoretically) acceptable reasons to the relevant agents which is prized.
The allusion to “the relevant set of political actors” reflects the fact that de-
liberative ideals don’t settle the question of whether polities should organize
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themselves into representative or direct democracies, and so the matter of ex-
actly whose deliberation is required is left up for grabs. And while some will
regard the satisfaction of the deliberation condition (however these antecedent
choice points are resolved) as a hard condition on the legitimacy of a polity,
others, sometimes called “instrumentalists,” will argue that satisfaction of this
condition is merely conducive to the achievement of political legitimacy.
I don’t here offer anything like an arbitration among the versions of
normative deliberative theory offered historically in Rousseau, Kant and Mill,
or more recently by Rawls, Habermas, and many others. My project is the
very modest one of suggesting that any level of commitment to a version of
deliberativism motivates an interest in deliberative polarization. And some
level of commitment is seemingly widespread. It is often claimed that, as a
matter of descriptive fact, a hallmark of modernity is that the capacity to
give justificatory reasons for policy decisions is what individuals regard as
necessary for the legitimacy of these decisions (see e.g. Habermas (1979)).
This amounts to some aspects of normative deliberative democratic theory
being widely endorsed.
When considering why deliberativism motivates an interest in deliber-
ative polarization, it will be helpful to have a concrete example of deliberative
strategy variation in mind. Consider the following sets of rival arguments:
1. (a) A fetus may have a right to life, but a right to life does
not mean a right to use someone else’s body without
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their consent. So a mother is not obliged to carry a
fetus to term. So abortion is permissible.
(b) A fetus is not a person, and only persons are eligible for
ethical consideration. A fetus, in itself, is thus not eligi-
ble for ethical consideration. So abortion is permissible.
2. (a) Possessing a full complement of human genetic material
is all that’s required to have a right to life. A fetus is
fully, genetically human. So abortion is impermissible.
(b) What makes killing wrong, when it is wrong, is that
one is depriving a creature of their future. A fetus has
a future. So abortion is impermissible.
The first pair of arguments arrive at the same conclusion, as do those
of the second pair. But within each pair, it’s evident that that conclusion is
reached in different ways; here we see deliberative strategy variation with ulti-
mate doxastic convergence. It’s moreover evident that any discourse between
the proponent of a pair-1 argument and the proponent of pair-2 argument
would need to engage in some reconstruction of their respective background
dialectics in order to figure out where they fundamentally diverged; the bits of
argumentation given here are clearly a ways downstream from such a dialecti-
cal divergence.
It’s pertinent here to observe that a common feature of the most intractable-
seeming debates on issues of public importance, is what Alasdair MacIntyre
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went so far as to call “the conceptual incommensurability of the rival argu-
ments” (1981, p. 8). Macintyre observes that, among arguments like those
enumerated above,
Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be easily ex-
panded to be made so; the conclusions do indeed follow from the
premises. But the rival premises are such that we possess no ra-
tional way of weighing the claims of one as against another (1981,
p. 8)
I tend to think that saying we have no way to engage in this weighing
goes a bit far; it’s quite true, however, that doing so requires referring the de-
bate back to the abstractions that undergird it, and that doing so often poses
practical problems. In any case, MacIntyre raises the worry that deliberators
who are attending to the contours of such rival arguments, and who fail to
trace the dialectic back, will be left uncertain about how to bring the reasons
mustered by each into contact with one another. One might find oneself com-
pelled by arguments from each of the above pairs, but, lacking any principled
procedure for deciding which is the more compelling, forgo the formation of
an opinion altogether or, as one suspects is more likely, break the stalemate
through the use of some unprincipled method. For such deliberators, it’s then
not clear how the process of weighing reasons against one another can, by
itself, conclude in anything like the “discursive will-formation” envisioned by
Habermas and other deliberativists.
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I think that certain patterns of deliberative strategy variation endanger
deliberativist norms for reasons beyond those raised in the above passage from
MacIntyre. Whereas he was concerned about individuals who were more or
less receptive to all of the above arguments, as far as they went, I am worried
about those who are so unexposed to other deliberative strategies that, when
confronted with them, they can not even see the pertinence of the mustered
reasons to the issue at hand; while MacIntyre’s agent was befuddled by her
very neutrality, mine is limited by her conditioned partiality.
I’ll make this suggestion more vivid with a concrete example. Consider
debate around health care policy in the contemporary United States. Sim-
plifying greatly, rhetoric on the left suggests that the decisive issue in this
policy domain is what level of health care people have a right to; from there,
remaining questions concern method of delivery and political expediency of
implementation strategies. On the right, the decisive question remains which
responsibilities the government has to arrange for citizens’ health care and,
in turn, which coercive powers to do this arranging should be ceded to it.
While the right and the left might be distinguished by the conclusions they
characteristically reach about health policy questions (i.e. regimes of extensive
government regulation up to and including a single-payer system, as opposed
to “market-based” or entirely free-market responses), this attention to their
respective deliberative starting places sheds light on why these debates are
seemingly intractable.
Geographical and media polarization increase the chances that an agent
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may be regularly exposed to only one of these deliberative strategies concerning
health care. Such an agent, confronted by someone propounding, or tacitly
relying upon, an alternative strategy, may just fail to see the reasons proffered
in this alternative strategy as relevant at all to the policy question at hand.
A liberal American, after tuning into Fox News on a whim, or hazarding
a chat with her Republican coworker, might think “My god, why are we talking
about the dangers of creeping authoritarianism in a debate about health care?
Our current health care system is killing people, so it’s obvious that we need
Medicare for all. The rest is an idiotic diversion.” While this is a caricature,
it includes two features which I suspect are characteristic of real such encoun-
ters: 1) the agent regards the opposite side’s putative justifications as almost
non-sequiturs, and 2) she begins to suspect that only stupidity (“idiotic”) or
bad faith (a “diversion” is being executed) can explain what’s going on. The
latter feature is not essential to my argument here, but is suggestive of a way
that deliberative and affective polarization are connected. The first though
constitutes the sort of threat to deliberative democratic ideals that delibera-
tive polarization really poses: it renders large swaths of constituents insensible
to the dialectics that animate each other’s policy preferences. Crucially, de-
liberative polarization consists not just in constituents disagreeing (doxastic
polarization) or disliking each other (affective polarization), or even in their
simply not speaking to each other (some variety of network polarization) but
in their being ill-equipped to engage deliberatively even should they end up in
a conversation with one another.
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3.2.2 Deliberative Polarization as Propaganda
My claim will be this this: a deliberatively polarized mass discourse
just is an instance of propaganda. This will strike some as sounding strange,
since we normally take it that that the sort of things that can count as pro-
paganda are individual expressive acts (e.g. the making of an utterance, the
posting of a poster) not whole discourses. However, it will be distinctive of
the type of the type of propaganda I introduce here, Deliberative Polarization
Propaganda (DPP), that its instances are structured bodies of expressive acts
(i.e. discourses), rather than individual such acts. It will nonetheless remain
natural to think of individual expressive acts and unstructured bodies of these
acts as instances of DPP, though their status as such will be derivative.
Distinguishing DPP as a type of propaganda is not intended as a stipu-
lative extension of the meaning of the term “propaganda”, but as a substantive
proposal about which things in the world count as propaganda if the charac-
terizations of propaganda that are already commonplace, such as those by
Stanley, Ellul and Marlin considered above, are correct.
Deliberative polarization per se doesn’t limit the strategies one uses
in deliberation about a key policy question; we can easily imagine a non-
polarized public where individuals’ deliberative horizons excluded valuable
ways of thinking through a problem. Nor does deliberative polarization mean
that more agents will deliberate in less rational ways. But deliberative po-
larization is a state of affairs responsible for closing off debate by providing
conditions amenable to the development of incongruous deliberative strategies
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between different sections of the population. It threatens epistemic integrity
of the group, rather than that of the individual.
What I’ve tried to do in this section is render explicit the notion of
polarization that I say is functionally propagandistic. In §5 I will provide
further arguments in favor of this approach.
Next though, I develop a formally precise ways of characterizing delib-
erative polarization. Building on existing models of information structure in
non-mass discourses, I develop a method of representing the ways in which
agents in a polity may deliberate about a particular policy issue. I then offer
a method of mass discourse analysis that effectively measures the degree to
which agents’ “deliberative scripts” on an issue converge or diverge.
3.3 Discourses, Mass and Count
The phenomenon I will be calling mass discourse is a collection of ex-
pressive acts (e.g. utterances). But which ones? Some things that one might
take as the target of an inquiry into mass discourse are as follows:
1. Everything said within certain geographical or temporal boundaries
2. Everything said by the mass media and/or elites
3. Everything said publicly, by anyone
It is this third option that I have in my cross-hairs. To be clear though,
it’s not that I think there exists one single mass discourse either; “mass dis-
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course,” as I’ll use the phrase, is (not unintuitively) a mass term, not a count
term. We can talk about a given quantity of mass discourse, drawing the
boundaries (e.g. geographical, topical and temporal) however we like, just
as we can talk about a particular quantity of water in a glass. And as with
“water,” we can if we like use “mass discourse” as a count term when there
are some salient partitioned portions of it to refer to (e.g. to a courier bearing
bottles of Aquafina, “Bring the waters over here;” by a scholar of comparative
politics: “The mass discourses of India and China are importantly different.”).
But where no salient portion is specified, the meaning of “public discourse”
defaults to referring to the undistinguished mass rather than a portion of it.
What it is for something to be said “publicly” is of course a remaining
question. Rather than a nuanced elucidation of our, arguably historically
specific, notion of publicity (see e.g. Habermas (2015)), my characterization
of publicity here is operationalized for practical use by the social scientist
engaged in mass discourse analysis who just wamts to know when to include a
case in their body of data2. Here then, what is public is what is easily accessible
(perhaps also actually widely accessed); it includes media messaging; policy
documents; statements disseminated by political figures, corporations or not-
for profits; blogs, television, Twitter, Facebook; and so on.
I will be offering a model of mass discourse that builds on models of
non-mass discourse. Non-mass discourse, or what I will (nodding once again
2Notably, I think a more critical characterization of publicity is necessary when giving
an account of public opinion– it’s just that I don’t touch that phenomenon here.
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to the grammatical properties of the expression) call “count discourses” or “c-
discourses,” is the variety of discourse about which most linguistic theorizing
has been done. “C-discourse” is really a name for the kinds of conversations
that we have on a day-to-day basis; they typically, though not necessarily, in-
volve a relatively small number of people and typically, though not necessarily,
involve contributions from multiple speakers. The category of c-discourse is
not sharply delineable, but nor is providing such a delineation necessary for
this project. All that’s important is that the phenomenon be grasped so that
it can be contrasted with that of mass discourse.
Another sort of discourse worth mentioning in order to distinguish it
from my target variety of mass discourse is that associated with the post-
structuralist tradition in general, and with Michel Foucault in particular. This
is all the more necessary since this type is typically referred to simply as dis-
course, without any qualifying adjectives. In the Foucauldian sense of the term,
a discourse is a set of those key “statements” (another common term given a
technical meaning) which act to delimit the very conception of a practice or
subject matter. Although Foucault describes the entities he calls statements
as “events,” they are not token utterances or written statements. On his tech-
nical sense, statements are bits of normative content, and so are a type of
message rather than a token instance of messaging. They are events only in
that they are specific to a time period. The token utterances or amalgams
thereof we find in c-discourses (as characterized above) can be said to par-
ticipate in or partake of the statements that constitute a discourse, and they
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can even amount to what Foucault calls “discourse formation” by propagating
new such statements (Foucault (2002)). The point to be clear on, however, is
that what I’ll call “mass discourse” is not the same thing as what those in the
Foucauldian tradition are getting at.
3.3.1 C-Discourse Structure
Conversations are more often than not arranged around topics. Having
a sense of what the present topic is helps interlocutors know what it would
be relevant to add, and also helps them derive implicatures and resolve ambi-
guities in others’ utterances. In formal pragmatics, the relation between and
among a discourse’s constitutive topics and utterance, is referred to as the
discourse’s structure. To date, discourse structure has been a phenomenon of
interest primarily to linguists and philosophers of language (e.g. ?). Part of
the upshot of this paper is that it must come to be of significant interest to
social epistemologists and political philosophers, as well as those in the so-
cial sciences who study media effects on public opinion, and political behavior
more broadly.
One modeling apparatus used for this task is one that organizes dis-
course into the question that is under discussion at a given time, and which
registers the relationships between successive and contemporaneous questions.
A few key notions of this model are as follows:
• Questions: Thought of here as sets of the propositions that would count
as their answers (Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984b), ?, Hamblin (1973b)).
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• Full and partial answers: A partial answer entails the truth or falsity
of at least one element of the set of alternative propositions denoted by
the question to which it is an answer. A full answer entails the truth or
falsity of every member of that set.
• Sub- and Super-questions: One question, q1, is a subquestion of another,
q2, iff any complete answer to q2 entails a complete answer to q1. Sub-
questions are sometimes characterized as strategies for answering their
superquestion.
I here provide a full characterization of the model I will be using for
c-discourse3, though for most intents and purposes, the above bullet points are
sufficient. For a given c-discourse, D:
InfoStrD = 〈M , Q, A, C, Acc, CG, QUD〉.
1. M is the set of moves in D
2. Q is the set of questions in D (Q ⊆ M)
3. A is the set of answers in D (A ⊆ M)
4. C is a function from M to date and time stamps, yielding for each m ∈
M the date and time at which it was made
5. Acc is the set of accepted moves in the discourse (Acc ⊆ M)
3This model is closely based on that in Roberts 2012. In other work I motivate and
introduce some extensive alterations, but as these aren’t relevant here I stick with the more
basic model.
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6. CG is a function from M to sets of propositions, yielding for each m ∈
M the common ground of D just prior to the making of m.
7. QUD is a function from M to ordered subsets of Q ∩ Acc such that, for
all m ∈ M:
(a) For all q ∈ Q ∩ Acc, q ∈ QUDn(m) iff:
i. C(q) < C(m)
ii. CG(m) doesn’t entail an answer to q and q has not been
determined to be unanswerable.
I want briefly to mention an alternative way that one might model
discourse structure and explain why this is not the method I employ in this
project. Quantitative methods in sociolinguistics and in the kind of discourse
analysis that takes place across disciplines as diverse as political science, cul-
tural studies, sociology, economics and literary studies, have developed various
ways of automating the separation of discourse into parts with different top-
ics, and of analyzing features like the changes in, and co-occurence between,
different topics (see e.g. Blei (2012)). The notion of topichood exploited by
those models based on Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is quite different
from the notion of topichood that arises from the literature using QUDs to
structure discourse. For those using LDA, a topic is a distribution across some
vocabulary, and sections of text are probabilistically assigned topics based on
how the term frequencies within them match the distributions associated with
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each topic. Using QUD models, the topic of conversation is not characterized
by term frequency or distributions of term frequencies across the text, but by
the notion of a question currently under discussion. No doubt because of the
difficulty involved in the automation of this method for coding corpora, the
notion of topichood and structure developed in the above literature is not yet
used in any extensive corpus analysis. Nonetheless, I employ it in the current
project because, unlike LDA-based models, it captures relations between topics
beyond that of, say, proximity in a text. Models which construe information
structure in terms of sub- and super-questions nicely capture the contours of
deliberative strategies and so render tractable the project of high-resolution
comparison between rival such strategies.
3.3.2 Mass Discourse Structure
On my conception, a mass discourse is partially constituted by a col-
lection or sample of c-discourses. A key insight is that, for our model to draw
to the foreground the sort of structure that we’re interested in, we must think
of a mass discourse’s constituent c-discourses as retaining their internal struc-
ture even as they are aggregated into a mass. This point is more vivid if we
consider the alternative. We might have considered mass discourse as sort
of a large vessel into which a variety of smaller vessels, c-discourses, emptied
their contents. If what we wanted to know was, for instance, how frequently
an expression was used in a certain population and across a certain time in-
terval, this approach would be perfectly fine; total expression frequency in a
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mass discourse is a property left intact even if the internal structure of its
c-discourses is not. But what we in fact want to know is how the deliberative
strategy enacted in individual c-discourses, a property of these c-discourses
discernible at the level of their information structure, varies across a sample.
For this reason, the model of mass discourse that I’ll be offering is parasitic
on the above model of c-discourses.
With this model of c-discourse structure in hand, we can posit a way to
compare the structures of individual c-discourses–the task for which our mass
discourse model is being developed. What we’ll be particularly interested in
doing is comparing c-discourses that both have a certain question on their
QUD stack at some point. Specifically, we’ll be interested in comparing the
sets of sub-questions that are laid on top of this shared question, as this is what
reflects the differences and similarities in the way that the shared superquestion
is deliberated about in each c-discourse.
Notice that, at the point of any move in a discourse, m, QUD(m)
delivers the set of questions on the QUD stack at the moment immediately
antecedent to m, and the contents of this set are ordered through application
of the C function, which associates each element with its time stamp, among
which the natural (i.e. chronological) order obtains. Although this chronolog-
ical ordering doesn’t rule out any two questions on the QUD stack having the
same time stamp, the idealizations associated with at least Roberts’ approach
to the QUD model do rule this out. As a result, for any m, there is a total
order on QUD(m). Again because of the assumptions of the Roberts model,
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this order reflects the sub-question/ super-question relationship in that each
question is a subquestion of the question of the one preceding it (should there
be any such) and a super-question of the one following it (should there be
any such). All of this means that the state of a QUD stack (i.e. the totally
ordered set that is the output of the QUD function) can always be represented
as a tree structure in which the daughter relationship corresponds to the sub-
question relationship, and that such a structure will only ever feature a unary
branching structure, since binary or greater branching would suggest a merely
partial order on the QUD stack, which has been ruled out:
A
B
C
D
Trees representing synchronic discourse structure will all feature such
unary branching. But notice that when we engage in conversation about some
vexing question, q, we may pursue multiple subquestions to q consecutively,
and that each of these first-generation subquestions may in turn have multiple
consecutive subquestions of their own, and so on. A tree representation of
our diachronic deliberation about q will involve greater than unary branching
structure, in which some questions bear sister, rather than mother or daughter,
relations to one another:
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AB
E F
C
G
D
H I
A full deliberative strategy concerning a question, α, is going to be
most apparent by looking at the α-region of such a diachronic tree represen-
tation. A comparison between diachronic discourse structures is then what
we’re interested in here. As the first pieces of a formal characterization of how
to do this, suppose that we have a sample of c-discourses, D. I introduce the
following function, Strat, which, for any discourse, d, which is within our sam-
ple, D, and any question, α, yields the ordered set of questions which occur at
some level of sub-question in the diachronic q-deliberation which takes place
in d4:
Strat is a function
from {〈d, α〉|d ∈ D and ∃x(α ∈ QUDd(x) and x ∈Md)}
to {q: q∈ Qd ∩ Accd and ∃x(α ∈ QUDd(x) and x ∈Md) and C(q) > C(α)}
Note that Strat(d, α) is undefined if d at no point addresses the question
α. We then have a convenient way of formally specifying those discourses in
our sample which address a particular question using the Pert (as in pertinent)
function as follows:
4I haven’t included here a formal specification of the way that the nested ordering on
generations of sub-questions is maintained. The requisite formalism is relatively straightfor-
ward but not terribly interesting. It has been omitted just for the purposes of streamlining
the model’s elaboration.
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Pert is a function
from {〈D,α〉|D is the set of c-discourses in a mass discourse sample}
to {x|x ∈ D and Strat(x, α) is defined}
To qualitatively compare the deliberative strategies regarding some
question, α, in two c-discourses, d1 and d2, one then compares the output
of the Strat function for each. Of primary concern here though is the ability
to quantitatively determine their similarity. I introduce the CStrat function
to do this, which is definable as follows:
CStrat is a function
from {〈d1, d2, α〉|d1, d2 ∈ D and ∃x∃y(α ∈ QUDd1(x) and x ∈ Md1 and
α ∈ QUDd2(y) and x ∈Md2)}
to the value given by
|Strat(d1, α) ∩ Strat(d2, α)|
0.5(|Strat(d1, α)|+ |Strat(d2, α)|)
CStrat assigns to any pair of discourses a similarity score vis-a`-vis their
deliberation about a particular question. With this similarity metric in hand,
we are then in principle positioned to cluster discourses in a sample on the basis
of their similarity scores. Very generally, a cluster is a concentration of points
associated with the same value vis-a`-vis a categorical variable, or associated
with relatively similar values vis-a`-vis a continuous variable. Clustering is a
routine statistical task, though one which can be executed in a number of ways.
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The exact clustering algorithm right for the task is not an issue I pursue here.
What is important for our purposes is that we’ve set up the necessary input
for the clustering task (i.e. developed a similarity metric) and that we go on,
as I do in the next section, to say what interesting conclusions we can reach
on the basis of this task’s output.
A last component of the mass discourse model I’m developing here is the
semi-technical notion of an agent accessing a discourse. To access a discourse is
to witness it in some capacity, whether as a participant or a passive onlooker;
I access the discourse I engage in with my friend over the lunch table, and
I also access the discourse between Presidential candidates when I stream a
televised debate.
That last piece squared away, the full model of mass discourse structure
which our above work has helped us develop is as follows. Let some particular
sample of mass discourse be called B. MassInfB= {A, D, R, Strat, CStrat,
Pert} such that:
1. A is the set of agents present in B.
2. D is the set of c-discourses present in B.
3. R is a relation between A and D, such that anRdn just in case an is
witness to dn.
4. Strat is a function
from {〈d, α〉|d ∈ D and ∃x(α ∈ QUDd(x) and x ∈Md)}
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to {q: q∈ Qd ∩ Accd and ∃x(α ∈ QUDd(x) and x ∈ Md) and C(q) >
C(α)}
5. CStrat is a function
from {〈d1, d2, α〉|d1, d2 ∈ D and ∃x∃y(α ∈ QUDd1(x) and x ∈Md1 and
α ∈ QUDd2(y) and x ∈Md2)}
to the value given by |Strat(d1,α)∩Strat(d2,α)|
0.5(|Strat(d1,α)|+|Strat(d2,α)|)
6. Pert is a function
from {〈D,α〉|D is the set of c-discourses in a mass discourse sample}
to {x|x ∈ D and Strat(x, α) is defined}
3.4 Measuring Deliberative Polarization
In what follows, I informally characterize two dimensions of delibera-
tive polarization propaganda, and then demonstrate how the model developed
above allows us to articulate indices for these two dimensions. These two
dimensions are siloization and insularity. Deliberative polarization on a pol-
icy question requires that a mass discourse feature c-discourses which vary
widely in the deliberative strategies they enact with respect to this question.
This is what I’ll be calling siloization. But it also requires that individual
agents’ access profiles are skewed toward discourses that enact some delibera-
tive strategies rather than others. This is what I’ll call insularity.
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3.4.1 Silos
Siloization is the degree to which the c-discourses on an issue are split
between different deliberative strategies.
For a sample of mass discourse, B, subsets S1 and S2 of DB such that
|S1| = n and |S2| = m are silos with respect to a question, q iff:
[(
n
2
)−1( dnS1∑
i=d1S1
dnS1∑
j=d1S1
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
>
[
1
nm
( dnS1∑
i=d1S1
dmS2∑
j=d1S2
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
and
[(
m
2
)−1( dmS2∑
i=d1S2
dmS2∑
j=d1S2
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
>
[
1
nm
( dnS1∑
i=d1S1
dmS2∑
j=d1S2
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
This first equation represents a state of affairs where the average simi-
larity in deliberative scripts with respect to q among elements of S1 is greater
than the average similarity in deliberative scripts between elements of S1 and
S2, and the second a state of affairs where the average similarity in delibera-
tive scripts with respect to q among elements of S2 is greater than the average
similarity in deliberative scripts between elements of S1 and S2.
Discourses which feature silos with respect to a given question may do
so to differing degrees. We can quantify such differences using a Siloization
Index (SI). The SI is the average difference between a) how similar elements
of each respective silo are to their silo-mates and b) how similar they are to
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their non-silo-mates. For a sample of mass discourse, B, which has silos S1
and S2 with respect to a question, q such that |S1| = n and |S2| = m:
SIB,q,S1,S2=
1
2
[[(
n
2
)−1( dnS1∑
i=d1S1
dnS1∑
j=d1S1
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
+
[(
m
2
)−1( dmS2∑
i=d1S2
dmS2∑
j=d1S2
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]]
−
[
1
nm
( dnS1∑
i=d1S1
dmS2∑
j=d1S2
CStrat(i, j, q)
)]
This definition of silohood is such that a given discourse may have
multiple pairs of subsets that constitute silos with respect to a single question.
Using the above, we can also characterize a notion of maximal silohood:
Maximal Silos: For a sample of mass discourse, B, with subsets S1
and S2 of DB such that |S1| = n and |S2| = m, S1 and S2 are maximal silos
with respect to a question, q iff:
1. S1 ∪ S2 = Pert(D, q)5
2. There are no silos of B with respect to q that generate a higher SI than
do S1 and S2.
This gives rise to an intuitive notion of a Maximal Siloization Index,
which is the SI for a question in a sample of mass discourse calculated based
5There is good reason to ask whether we should really want all q-addressing discourses to
be sorted into silos, rather than allowing some discourses to go unsiloed. Without something
like this provision however, B’s maximal SI might be based on relatively small clusters of
c-discourses, and would fail to capture the more general distribution across D. This issue is
one I leave unsettled here.
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on that discourse’s maximal silos with respect to that question. We might
adopt the convention of understanding an SI to be a maximal SI whenever the
silos go unspecified in its subscript, i.e. SIB,q is the maximal SI for B and q.
3.4.2 Insularity
By itself, a high Siloization Index isn’t necessarily an indication that
the public is split between widely divergent deliberative scripts on an issue,
and so isn’t a good measure of DPP. To know whether the public is split
between widely divergent deliberative scripts, we need to know more about
who is accessing discourses in the respective silos. Because a given agent
can, in principle, access an unlimited number of discourses, there’s nothing
preventing them from accessing all silos. The additional information one wants
in order know whether high siloization actually amounts to a significant split
in the way that members of the public deliberate about an issue (i.e. DPP)
has to do with which agents access the discourses of each silo. A measure of
this feature is what I’ll call the Insularity Index (II). For a particular question,
q, and a set of agents AB, the Insularity Index is the proportion of agents in
AB who access any discourse that addresses q, for whom it’s the case that
more than, say, 80% of their accessed q-discourses come from just one silo.
For a sample of mass discourse, B, with silos (S1, S2...Sn) with respect to the
question q at time t:
IIB,q=
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∣∣∣∣∣
{
a : a ∈ AB and ∃n
(
|{d:d∈Sn and aRd}|
|{d:d∈Pert(DB ,q) and aRd)}| > 0.8
)}∣∣∣∣∣
|{a : a ∈ AB and ∃d(d ∈ Pert(DB, q) and aRd)}|
We will assume, as above, that where no silos are specified in the sub-
script of II this is the insularity score for the maximal silos of B vis-a`-vis q.
The exact threshold of 80% is more or less arbitrary, and any implementation
of this index could customize this aspect. Of note is that a sample of discourse
with no silos regarding a question would have no insularity score with respect
to that question.
Together, Siloization and Insularity Indices give a sense of how divided
a group of agents is with respect to their deliberation on an issue. In the
paradigm developed above, these scores are then indicators of Deliberative
Polarization Propagandicity.
3.5 A Further Theoretical Advantage of the Approach
Now that my full approach to operationalizing Deliberative Polariza-
tion Propagandicity has been developed, I want briefly to mention a further
advantage of the approach vis-a`-vis its relations to certain theoretical com-
mitments in democratic theory. Specifically, I want to address the capacity of
this approach to reflect those dimensions of propaganda which go beyond the
epistemic. Consider the American electorate. In the US, significant portions
of the electorate lack even basic political knowledge concerning, for instance,
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which party controls Congress, the composition of the Supreme Court, or the
basic characteristics of “liberalism” or “conservatism”; this seems to have been
the case for as long as polls assessing citizens’ level of political knowledge have
been administered (Converse (1964/ 2006), Lupia (2016)). The political be-
liefs of what are, in this literature, referred to as “unsophisticated” agents are
marked by a low degree of temporal stability; a susceptibility to alteration by
the language of opinion polls (i.e. priming and framing effects); and a low de-
gree of what has come to be called “belief system constraint” (Converse (1964/
2006), Zaller (1992)). Belief systems are thought of as interdependent beliefs
where interdependence may amount to logical entailment between beliefs, or
else something more like ideological coherence. Those with less political knowl-
edge form new political beliefs under fewer such constraints. This means that
they may not see the connection between, say, decreasing tax revenue and cut-
ting social welfare spending, or between the former trade-off and the ideology
of small-government conservatism.
Notably, party identification seems to be much more durable over time,
and much more likely to constrain one’s political behaviors and preferences.
It’s just that this party identification is not, as an optimist might conjecture
from the armchair, reliably selected to match one’s antecedent political be-
liefs. Of course, people do switch party loyalties; but even in these cases,
it’s been suggested, their doing so is a consequence of a new party tapping
into their “group identity” (Achen & Bartels (2016)), as was the case with
US Republicans’ “Southern strategy” of the 60s and 70s. Social groups, be
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they ethnic, religious, class-based or otherwise, then replace party allegiance
as primary determinants of political behavior, but this paints no rosier picture
of the electorate’s rationality.
Those in a position to influence the behavior of mass publics know
all this. They know, therefore, that speaking to voters’ group loyalties is an
effective way to influence their political behavior while bypassing the onerous
task of rational persuasion. This picture of political psychology comes in weak
and strong varieties, which I distinguish here for the sake of precision rather
than any attempt to arbitrate between them. The weak view is that tapping
into group-identities can cause voters to adopt certain policy beliefs, which in
turn dispose them toward certain political behavior, without offering rationale
bases for these beliefs. The strong thesis is that tapping into group identities
can cause voters to take up a commitment to certain political behavior without
this behavior being undergirded by any policy beliefs, though policy beliefs
may be backfilled to justify one’s behavioral commitments. And behavior, be
it voting behavior or consumer behavior, is for most purposes all that it is in
political or financial elites’ interest to try to influence.
In recent work, Cory Wimberley nicely sums up the consequences of
the (weak) view of group-identity political psychology for our characterization
of propaganda:
Propagandists are not epistemologists and are not focused on a
battle to prove things true or false; they are governors seeking
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to alter the conduct of the public through tactical interventions
into public opinion: What interest have they in truth or falsehood
except as it produces the conduct that their clients want to see?
(Wimberly (2017), p. 115)
Nor is this observation a new one; Jacques Ellul expressed a similar
thought half a century ago:
Very frequently propaganda is described as a manipulation for the
purpose of changing idea or opinions of making individuals ‘be-
lieve’ some idea or fact, and finally of making them adhere to some
doctrine–all matters of the mind... This is a completely wrong
line of thinking: to view propaganda as still being what it was in
1850 is to cling to an obsolete concept of man and of the means
to influence him; it is to condemn oneself to understand nothing
about propaganda. The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to
modify ideas, but to provoke action. (Ellul (1973), p. 25)
Rather than being messaging which disposes political agents to form
certain political beliefs or conduct theoretical reasoning in a certain way about
political matters, propaganda should be seen as propagating certain political
behavior. This characterization of propaganda is strictly neutral between the
strong and weak psychological theses sketched above; that is, whether or not
political messaging does typically route through (rational) policy belief for-
mation on its way to influencing behavior, where this messaging counts as
propaganda, the influence on behavior is the point. Presupposing for the
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moment a simple view of behavior’s psychological genesis, I submit that the
theorist of propaganda does well to regard propaganda as having effects on
both beliefs and other attitudes, like desires.
Wimberley highlights propaganda’s capacity to produce particular kinds
of “subjectivity”; that is, to leverage our antecedent desires or interests in or-
der to generate in us new, instrumental desires, and so remake us as ideal
consumers (p. 111: ‘Buy this fitness equipment and you will look like a Greek
god in sixty days!’). But I have in mind a different way in which propaganda
works on our non-doxastic attitudes. This is the alteration of organizing struc-
tures on our desires, such as the relationships we have to others.
Suppose my neighborhood wakes up one morning to posters on every
telephone pole and bulletin board declaring that, because of some innate char-
acteristic, certain community members are dangerous, scheming, and apt to
carry disease. I hope that we would unequivocally denounce these messages,
and that untargeted members of the community would offer support to those
targeted. But what if some suggested that there was, after all, some grain of
truth in what was said, that perhaps we should prevent our children associat-
ing with those of the dangerous group? Regardless of how this story continues,
relationships between neighbors have already changed; some suspect that their
neighbors are all the things suggested by the posters, and others come to mis-
trust their untargeted neighbors because they don’t know who might have
been thus taken in. Our relationships have been changed, indeed harmed, by
propaganda.
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That propaganda’s effect on relationships may normally be mediated by
beliefs (almost certainly true) is not a threat to my claim here; what is essential
is that the point of propaganda is often to alter relationships, just as much as
it is to instill certain beliefs. And the variety of relationship which propaganda
might be said to characteristically undermine is that of civic friendship. This
point is anticipated in recent literature which argues that the absence of co-
deliberation on policy issues, in addition to undermining ideals of public reason
in the way I elaborated on in §2, undermines relationships of civic friendship
(Ebels-Duggan (2010); Lister (2013)). A notion of propagandicity that looks
at the sort of latent deliberative networks existing, and not existing, among
agents in a polity, as ours does, then tracks both beliefs and (crucial structures
on) desires, the two crucial psychological antecedents to behavior which it is
propaganda’s ultimate goal to control. It is a strength of this approach that
it proposes the forensic utility of tracking shifting deliberative relationships
among polity members.
3.6 Conclusion
In the foregoing, I have characterized those features of propaganda that
I think a discourse-structural analysis helps lay bare. I have also provided a
way of conceiving of mass discourse as a network among count discourses and
agents and precisified characterizations of those features of mass discourse
which indicate system-wide propagandistic distortion. While regarding propa-
ganda as a property of systems has been productive, it may well be objected
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that this approach renders it questionable how to treat a diagnosis of propa-
ganda. What if it turns out a sample of mass discourse has high siloization
and insularity scores on many of its most pressing policy questions–what then?
Even well-intentioned and relatively influential agents in such a system might
wonder what unilateral actions they could take to alter such a massively sys-
temic issue. Likewise, an noninfluential media consumer, wanting to guard
themselves against manipulation, might be left at a loss. The basically foren-
sic nature of the project carved out here is incomplete until methods of defense
and counteroffensive are added to a method of detection. In the next stage of
this project, I plan to offer a way to identify particular information venues as
vectors of DPP; with this further diagnostic tool come a suite of therapeutic
ones for both consumers and distributors of political information.
It is also worth noting that I have motivated the development of a
model of deliberative polarization (of the kind that I think constitutes a form
of propaganda) in terms of political concerns, but this tool has applications
beyond the study of political polarization. Political issues are just one kind
of issue with respect to which a population can be deliberatively polarized.
Those with broadly Kuhnian or Feyerabendian views on the history and the
philosophy of science might be seen as describing deliberative polarization as
part of the mechanism of radical theory change. Likewise, the split between
analytic and continental philosophers on issues with which they are both con-
cerned is likely characterizeable partially in terms of deliberative polarization.
These are applications I hope to explore in the future.
117
In the mean time, the central hope here has been that, in developing a
way of identifying propaganda that abstracts away from the partisan contents
of political messaging, we are empowered to discuss those first principles which
bear on our ideals for our polity’s discourse without being stymied by the very
political polarization that may constitute this discourse’s primary ailment.
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